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Why Supervise Banks?
The Foundations of the American
Monetary Settlement
Lev Menand*
Administrative agencies are generally designed to operate at arm’s
length, making rules and adjudicating cases. But the banking agencies are
different: they are designed to supervise. They work cooperatively with banks
and their remedial powers are so extensive they rarely use them. Oversight
proceeds through informal, confidential dialogue.
Today, supervision is under threat: banks oppose it, the banking
agencies restrict it, and scholars misconstrue it. Recently, the critique has
turned legal. Supervision’s skeptics draw on a uniform, flattened view of
administrative law to argue that supervision is inconsistent with norms of due
process and transparency. These arguments erode the intellectual and political
foundations of supervision. They also obscure its distinguished past and deny
its continued necessity.
This Article rescues supervision and recovers its historical pedigree. It
argues that our current understanding of supervision is both historically and
conceptually blinkered. Understanding supervision requires understanding the
theory of banking motivating it and revealing the broader institutional order
that depends on it. This Article terms that order the “American Monetary
Settlement” (“AMS”). The AMS is designed to solve an extremely difficult
governance problem—creating an elastic money supply. It uses specially
chartered banks to create money and supervisors to act as outsourcers,
overseeing the managers who operate banks.
Supervision is now under increasing pressure due to fundamental
changes in the political economy of finance. Beginning in the 1950s, the
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government started to allow nonbanks to expand the money supply, devaluing
the banking franchise. Then, the government weakened the link between
supervision and money creation by permitting banks to engage in unrelated
business activities. This transformation undermined the normative foundations
of supervisory governance, fueling today’s desupervisory movement.
Desupervision, in turn, cedes public power to private actors and risks endemic
economic instability.
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INTRODUCTION
Administrative agencies are usually designed to operate at arm’s
length, enforcing broad statutory principles through formal legal
proceedings and making generally applicable rules following public
notice and comment. In practice, many agencies also operate
informally, relying on guidance—nonbinding, rule-like statements of
general applicability—to accomplish their statutory goals.1 But the
federal banking agencies—the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(“OCC”), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“Fed”),
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”)—are
different. They were designed to operate informally; they “supervise.”2
Supervision is a form of governance distinct from rulemaking,
adjudication, and guidance. It proceeds through iterative, ongoing,
firm-specific engagement.3 In the case of banks, supervision is the
product of statutory provisions granting the OCC, Fed, and FDIC
capacious approval powers,4 monitoring rights,5 and remedial
1.
See, e.g., Nicholas R. Parrillo, Federal Agency Guidance and the Power to Bind: An
Empirical Study of Agencies and Industries, 36 YALE J. ON REGUL. 165 (2019) (examining the role
of guidance); see also Rory Van Loo, Regulatory Monitors: Policing Firms in the Compliance Era,
119 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 384–86 (2019) (examining how agencies exercise discretion in deciding
when and how to enforce the law); Christopher J. Walker, Administrative Law Without Courts, 65
UCLA L. REV. 1620 (2018) (examining seven categories of administrative activity largely insulted
from judicial review); Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and Informal Modes of
Administrative Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 159 (2000) (examining the use of guidance and
assessing its causes and effects).
2.
See Guidance, Supervisory Expectations, and the Rule of Law: How Do the Banking
Agencies Regulate and Supervise Institutions?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. &
Urb. Affs., 116th Cong. 6 (2019) [hereinafter Guidance, Supervisory Expectations, and the Rule of
Law] (statement of Margaret E. Tahyar, Partner, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP) (“Many sectors of
the economy today are regulated, but only the banking sector is also supervised.”); Indep. Bankers
Ass’n of Am. v. Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164, 1168 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (explaining that banks are
subject to the “most intensive supervision” of any industry). This Article focuses on national banks
supervised by the OCC, bank holding companies and state “member” banks supervised by the Fed,
and state “nonmember” banks supervised by the FDIC. It refers to them collectively as “banks.”
The analysis could be extended to federal savings and loan associations, which are a special type
of bank also supervised by the OCC. See 12 U.S.C. § 5412. This Article does not treat the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) as a banking agency. Congress created the CFPB in 2010
to eliminate predatory practices at bank and nonbank lenders. See Adam J. Levitin, The
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 321 (2013).
3.
See infra notes 29, 56.
4.
The agencies decide if banks can commence business, see 12 U.S.C. §§ 26-27 (national
banks), id. § 1815 (insured state nonmember banks), id. § 321 (state member banks); alter their
capital structures, see id. §§ 51a, 51b, 57, 59 (national banks); or expand their activities, see id.
§§ 21, 24 (national banks), id. § 1844 (bank holding companies), id. § 1831a (insured state banks).
They can also veto mergers and acquisitions, id. § 215 (national banks), id. §§ 1842, 1850 (bank
holding companies), and place banks into receivership outside of the bankruptcy process (without
notice or a hearing), id. § 191 (national banks), id. § 1821 (insured banks).
5.
The agencies can review books and records, administer oaths, take testimony, subpoena
witnesses, and shield the examination process from public disclosure. See id. § 481 (national
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authorities.6 For example, the agencies can discipline banks not only
when bankers break express legal rules, but whenever, “in the opinion
of [the agencies],” bankers are engaging in, have engaged in, or the
agencies reasonably believe are about to engage in “unsafe or unsound
practice[s].”7 Rather than specify what sort of practices are “unsafe” or
“unsound,” Congress authorized the agencies to “define and eliminate”
them.8 And the courts have held that the “discretionary authority” of
the agencies to do this “is to be liberally construed.”9
But unlike the National Labor Relations Board,10 Federal Trade
Commission,11 or other government bodies that apply similar standards
ex post to specific circumstances, the banking agencies—by design—
almost never end up in court. 12 Instead, they sort things out privately,
sharing their safety and soundness concerns through routine
communications and confidential letters known as “matters requiring
attention” (“MRAs”).13 For large banks, this dialogue is continuous, with
agency examiners working, day in and day out, at offices and desks
banks); id. § 483 (member banks); id. § 1844(c) (bank holding companies); id. § 1820(b) (insured
banks); id. § 1818(n); infra note 96 (citing regulations deeming supervisory work product
government property).
6.
The agencies can direct banks to claw back bonuses, halt dividends, and divest assets. 12
U.S.C. § 1818(b). They can also levy fines and trigger criminal penalties. Id. § 1818(i) (civil money
penalties for insured banks); id. § 1818(j) (criminal sanctions for insured banks); id. § 93(b) (civil
money penalties for national banks). And they can terminate deposit insurance coverage, id.
§ 1818(a); revoke charters, id. § 93(a); deny access to government loans, id. § 347b(b)(4); and
remove bank executives from office, id. § 1818(e).
7.
Id. § 1818(b) (emphasis added); see also id. § 1831p-1 (enabling rulemaking). In the case
of cash advances, even this finding is not required; the Fed can cut banks off for no reason at all.
Id. § 347b(b)(4); see also supra note 6.
8.
Indep. Bankers Ass’n of Am. v. Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Congress
expects courts to defer to the agencies whenever a bank “has been harmed or the interests of the
depositors have been prejudiced without requiring the agencies to quantify the harm or prejudice.”
H.R. REP. NO. 101-222, at 439 (1989) (Conf. Rep.) (for the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery,
and Enforcement Act); see also MCorp Fin., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 900 F.2d 852,
862 (5th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he phrase ‘unsafe or unsound banking practice’ is widely used in the
regulatory statutes and in case law, and one of the purposes of the banking acts is clearly to commit
the progressive definition and eradication of such practices to the expertise of the appropriate
regulatory agencies.” (quoting Groos Nat’l Bank v. Comptroller of Currency, 573 F.2d 889, 897 (5th
Cir. 1978))).
9.
Indep. Bankers Ass’n, 613 F.2d at 1168–69. See also Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n
v. Douglas, 105 F.2d 100, 104 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (describing the comptroller’s power over national
banks as “plenary”).
10. National Labor Relations Act § 10, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (empowering the National Labor
Relations Board to combat “unfair labor practices”).
11. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (empowering the Federal Trade
Commission to combat “unfair methods of competition”).
12. See In re Subpoena Served Upon the Comptroller of the Currency, 967 F.2d 630, 634 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (“It is the very rare dispute, however, that culminates in any formal action . . . .”).
13. Thomas Eisenbach, Andrew Haughwout, Beverly Hirtle, Anna Kovner, David Lucca &
Matthew Plosser, Supervising Large Complex Financial Institutions: What Do Supervisors Do?, 23
FED. RSRV. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL'Y REV. 57, 72–73 (2017).
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inside the bank.14 In the words of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, the supervisory relationship is “extensive
and informal”:
It is extensive in that bank examiners concern themselves with all manner of a bank’s
affairs . . . . [And it] is informal in the sense that it calls for adjustment, not adjudication.
In the process of comment and response, the bank may agree to change some aspect of its
operation or accounting . . . [but it] is the very rare dispute . . . that culminates in any
formal action . . . .15

Even the internal appeals mechanism is barely used.16
This mode of governance—continuous and confidential comment
and response geared toward “safety and soundness”—is now under
pressure. Beginning in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the banking
agencies unilaterally disarmed, rolling back their oversight of bank
business practices and adopting permissive bright-line rules focused on
shareholder equity levels.17 Agency leaders argued that shareholders
would be better stewards of safety and soundness and that government
officials and agency staff were not capable of understanding the risks
banks were taking.18
The result was the worst financial crisis since the Great
Depression. Amid the fallout, legislators were indignant. Where were
the supervisors?19 The agencies reversed course. President Obama
appointed new officials, including Dan Tarullo at the Federal Reserve.
Governor Tarullo and his colleagues revived traditional oversight and
developed an innovative stress testing program for supervising large
financial conglomerates. This program allowed the Fed to control risk
taking, dividend payments, and share buybacks. In the years that
followed, banks strengthened their capital structures, reduced their
leverage, and altered their business models.

14. See id. (describing prudential supervision by the Federal Reserve); In re Subpoena Served
Upon the Comptroller of the Currency, 967 F.2d at 633–34.
15. In re Subpoena Served Upon the Comptroller of the Currency, 967 F.2d at 633–34
(emphasis added).
16. Julie Andersen Hill, When Bank Examiners Get It Wrong: Financial Institution Appeals
of Material Supervisory Determinations, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1101, 1105 (2015) (showing that the
appeals rate is “astonishingly low”).
17. See Lev Menand, Too Big To Supervise: The Rise of Financial Conglomerates and the
Decline of Discretionary Oversight in Banking, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1527, 1541–74 (2018).
18. See id. at 1551–74.
19. Modernizing Bank Supervision and Regulation, Part II: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous. & Urb. Affs., 111th Cong. 17 (2009) (Sen. Richard Shelby) (“Where were they? That
is the question. . . . [Y]ou would have to give them an ‘F’ . . . on their ability to regulate the banks.”).
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But now a second “desupervisory” wave is cresting.20 This time
the critique of supervision is not that the market knows best; instead,
it sounds in legal tones. Banks and their advocates argue that
supervision is opaque and inconsistent with administrative law
norms.21 Troublingly, agency officials agree, citing due process and
transparency to justify shifting the core of bank oversight (once again)
to notice-and-comment rulemaking.22 Thus, in the name of
administrative law regularity, the Fed has largely eliminated its stress
tests as a disciplining device.23 The Fed has also announced it will put
significant supervisory guidance out for comment, remove “bright lines”
20. WILLIAM K. BLACK, THE BEST WAY TO ROB A BANK IS TO OWN ONE: HOW CORPORATE
EXECUTIVES AND POLITICIANS LOOTED THE S&L INDUSTRY 32 (Univ. of Tex. rev. ed. 2013) (coining
the term “desupervision”).
21. See, e.g., Examination of the Federal Financial Regulatory System and Opportunities for
Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 115th Cong. 44–65 (2017) (statement of Gregory Baer, President, The Clearing House
Association) (criticizing stress testing, supervisory ratings, and supervisory engagement with bank
boards); Margaret E. Tahyar, Are Bank Regulators Special?, CLEARING HOUSE,
https://www.theclearinghouse.org/banking-perspectives/2018/2018-q1-bankingperspectives/articles/are-bank-regulators-special (last visited Oct. 13, 2020) [https://perma.cc/
62RA-SDUF] (arguing that the “lack of transparency and tensions with the APA in the” stress
tests are “just one example of many where guidance is used as a substitute for notice-and-comment
rulemaking”); Letter from Gregory Baer, President, The Clearing House Ass’n, to Anne Misback,
Sec’y, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. (Jan. 22, 2018) (supporting efforts to improve
transparency of the Fed’s stress testing); see also COMM. ON CAP. MKTS. REGUL., THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE STRESS TESTS: ENHANCING
TRANSPARENCY
1
(2016),
https://www.capmktsreg.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/TheAdministrative-Procedure-Act-and-Federal-Reserve-Stress-Tests-Enhancing-Transparency.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A8DT-DH7H] (arguing that the Fed has not complied with the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”) in adopting stress tests); Hal Scott, Stress Tests: Restore Compliance with
the APA, CLEARING HOUSE, https://www.theclearinghouse.org/banking-perspectives/2017/2017q3-banking-perspectives/articles/stress-tests-apa-compliance (last visited Oct. 13, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/LD9D-L3TC] (“Supervisory practices at the Federal Reserve must be reformed to
restore compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act, especially for stress tests.”).
22. See, e.g., Randal Quarles, Vice Chair for Supervision, Fed. Rsrv. Bd. of Governors,
Remarks at the Law and Macroeconomics Conference at Georgetown University Law Center: The
Global Evolution of Macroprudential Regulation 12 (Sept. 27, 2019) (arguing that supervisory
rollbacks are needed to “afford[ ] greater due process to the affected participants” and that the
initial stress tests “dispensed with due process considerations”); Randal Quarles, Vice Chair for
Supervision, Fed. Rsrv. Bd. of Governors, Remarks at the American Bar Association Banking Law
Committee Meeting: Spontaneity and Order: Transparency, Accountability, and Fairness in Bank
Supervision 12–14 (Jan. 17, 2020) [hereinafter Quarles, Spontaneity and Order] (making
recommendations to increase regulatory fairness and transparency); see also U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES: BANKS AND CREDIT
UNIONS 53 (2017) (recommending that “the Federal Reserve subject its stress-testing and capital
planning review frameworks to public notice and comment”).
23. The Fed has released information about its proprietary models, making the tests like
bright-line rules: exercises banks can game. The Fed has also reduced testing frequency and
limited the consequences for poor performance. See Daniel K. Tarullo, Are We Seeing the Demise
of Stress Testing?, BROOKINGS (June 25, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/
2020/06/25/stress-testing/ [https://perma.cc/7M58-SSVB] (“The stress testing regime that is
emerging appears little more than a compliance exercise.”).
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and “mandatory language,” and cut back on MRAs.24 These efforts have
culminated in a joint agency rulemaking stating that supervisory
guidance and engagement does not create “binding legal obligations for
the public” and prohibiting agency officials from “criticiz[ing]” banks for
failing to comply with it.25 Further easing is almost certainly taking
place behind closed doors.26
While scholars and practitioners have challenged some of these
changes27 and attacked administrative law monism on analytic
grounds,28 they have not returned to the legal, historical, and
conceptual bases of supervision. Key questions about the scope of
federal law, why it was designed to allow the agencies to proceed
informally, and why banks may not be entitled to the same level of
transparency and due process as other businesses have gone unasked.
It is forgotten that the Supreme Court and leading administrative law
theorists once understood bank supervision to be a distinct mode of
necessary, effective, and legitimate governance.29 Today, supervision is

24. Quarles, Spontaneity and Order, supra note 22, at 15. Similar retrenchment is in
evidence at the Financial Stability Oversight Council, which announced it would avoid imposing
Fed supervision on nonbank financial institutions and would instead prioritize rulemaking.
Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial Companies, 84
Fed. Reg. 9028, 9029 (Mar. 13, 2019) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R pt. 1310).
25. Role of Supervisory Guidance, 85 Fed. Reg. 70,512, 70,514–15 (proposed Nov. 5, 2020)
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 4, 262, 303, 791, 1074).
26. See, e.g., Lalita Clozel, Banks Get Kinder, Gentler Treatment Under Trump, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 12, 2018, 1:11 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/banks-get-kinder-gentler-treatmentunder-trump-11544638267 [https://perma.cc/M3Q3-364R] (quoting the Fed’s Quarles as saying
that changing supervision “will be the least visible thing I do and it will be the most consequential
thing I do”); Patrick Rucker, Trump Financial Regulator Quietly Shelved Discrimination Probes
into Bank of America and Other Lenders, PROPUBLICA (July 13, 2020, 5:00 AM EDT),
https://www.propublica.org/article/trump-financial-regulator-quietly-shelved-discriminationprobes-into-bank-of-america-and-other-lenders [https://perma.cc/9GBN-Z83C] (reporting that the
OCC halted investigations into whether Bank of America arbitrarily denied mortgage loans to
minority homebuyers).
27. See, e.g., Daniel K. Tarullo, Remarks at the Americans for Financial Reform Conference
on “Big Bank Regulation Under the Trump Administration”: Taking the Stress Out of Stress
Testing 9–10 (May 21, 2019) (arguing against watering down stress tests).
28. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Empty Call for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Financial
Regulation, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. S351, S352–53 (2014) (explaining why cost-benefit analysis is illsuited to constructive regulatory schemes like banking law); John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit
Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882, 885–89 (2015)
(explaining why cost-benefit analysis is not desirable for many forms of financial regulation).
29. See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 330 (1963) (describing “[f]ederal
supervision of banking” as “ ‘one of the most successful (systems of economic regulation), if not the
most successful’ ” to which “we may owe, in part, the virtual disappearance of bank failures . . . .”
(emphasis added) (quoting 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 4.04, at 247
(1958))); KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 44, at 157 (1951) (“The critical process in
the federal control of banking is the supervising power, not adjudication or rule making. The
supervising power is not and probably cannot be surrounded by formal procedural
safeguards . . . .”); LEONARD D. WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY,
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missing from administrative law casebooks,30 and when the banking
agencies are considered, their unusual informal methods are
undertheorized or ignored.31
This Article rescues supervision, recovering its past, explaining
its rationale, and defending its use. It argues that our current approach
to supervision is both historically and conceptually blinkered.
Understanding supervision requires understanding the theory of
banking that motivated it and the broader institutional order of which
it is a part. This Article terms that order the “American Monetary
Settlement” (“AMS”). The AMS is a comprehensive solution to an
extremely difficult governance problem—creating an “elastic” money
supply (i.e., one that expands over time to support a growing
economy).32 The legislators who established the OCC, the Fed, and the
FDIC believed that the power to expand the money supply was too great
to leave in the hands of elected bodies and that doing so would lead to
corruption, stagnation, and a debased currency. But they were also
afraid to allow the power to concentrate in the hands of a few unelected
executives. So, they steered a middle course by diffusing the power and
constraining it as much as possible. They set up a system of chartered
banks whereby anyone willing and able to comply with certain terms
and conditions could apply for a charter to create money.
This system has four pillars: (1) delegation—privately owned
banks, not the government, create the bulk of the money supply; (2)
separation—banks cannot engage in commerce (i.e., use their monetary
powers to compete in ordinary business activity); (3) open access—every
community is allowed its own banks, with charters available to the
general public on a nonpartisan basis; and (4) supervision—special

1829-1861, at 475 (1954) (describing “regular inspection in detail” of bank operations by official
agents “with power to act” as “the only effective means of controlling” banks).
30. Today’s leading casebooks, for example, do not consider banking at all even though the
OCC predated the Interstate Commerce Commission by more than two decades and supervision
served as a precedent for many aspects of the modern administrative state. See, e.g., PETER L.
STRAUSS, TODD D. RAKOFF, GILLIAN E. METZGER, DAVID J. BARRON & ANNE JOSEPH O’CONNELL,
GELLHORN & BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS (12th ed. 2017); STEPHEN G.
BREYER, RICHARD B. STEWART, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ADRIAN VERMEULE & MICHAEL HERZ,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES (8th ed. 2017);
JERRY L. MASHAW, RICHARD A. MERRILL, PETER M SHANE, M. ELIZABETH MAGILL, MARIANOFLORENTINO CUÉLLAR & NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC
LAW SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS (8th ed. 2014).
31. See infra Section I.A (discussing the secondary literature’s treatment and description of
the banking agencies).
32. Cf. Davidson v. Lanier, 71 U.S. 447, 454 (1866) (Chase, C.J.) (“To keep [the currency]
sound, and to guard it as far as possible from fluctuation, are among . . . the most difficult problems
of government.”).
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government officials are empowered to stamp out “unsound”33 banking
and ensure that banks fulfill their public purpose.34 Supervisors are not
regulators in the classical sense. They are outsourcers. And banks are
not like other private businesses. They are a form of premodern
independent agency: they use private shareholders and managers to
avoid monetary overissue and politicized asset allocation by the
government.35 Supervisors, in other words, do not restrict private
liberty; they enhance it by keeping these “agencies” in check.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I.A surveys our current
revisionist understanding of the banking agencies. It catalogues six
scholarly accounts, each of which accepts the premise of the
administrative law critique: that banks are just a type of private
business entitled to the same sort of procedural protections as any other
business. I call this the “licensing model.” While these accounts capture
important aspects of contemporary practice, they do not grapple with
the unusually broad scope of federal banking agency powers or the
statutory text that gives the agencies a specific, substantive mandate—
to eliminate unsafe and unsound banking. Nor can they explain the fact
that supervision predates many of the other institutional mechanisms
the government has established to bolster the AMS including the
Federal Deposit Insurance Fund (the “Fund”) and the Federal Reserve’s
Discount Window.36 Indeed, they obscure the special character of
banking that underlies them.
Part I.B advances a theory of bank supervision grounded in
banks’ monetary function. It shows that banks are not just for-profit
lenders. They are also a kind of mint, issuing notes and deposits
designed to circulate as a medium of exchange and serve as a store of
value.37 Privately owned mints exercise what was once referred to as
“delegated” authority.38 On this view, the banking agencies do not
“intervene” in private market activity; they are franchisors, designed to

33. Soundness is a technical term that reflects the animating purpose of banking law—to
create “bank money” that is equivalent to a “base” of government-issued cash or coin. The term
was first adopted by New York and Ohio in the 1840s and added to federal law in 1933. See infra
notes 185–189.
34. The degree of delegation, separation, open access, and supervision has varied since these
elements were first combined 180 years ago. And the progression has not always been linear. See
infra note 48; Parts II, III.
35. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein & Lawrence Lessig, The President and the Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 30 (1994) (describing the Second Bank of the United States as “the first truly
independent agency in the republic’s history”).
36. See infra Part II.
37. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 326 (1963) (“[B]anks do not merely deal
in[,] but are actually a source of, money . . . .”).
38. See infra notes 135, 255.
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charter banks and ensure that the notes and deposits they issue meet
government standards. I call this the “outsourcing model.”39
Part II shows why the outsourcing model better comports with
the statutory text, legislative history, and a century and a half of agency
practice at the state and federal level. Drawing on legislative archives,
newspaper accounts, presidential papers, and early administrative law
scholarship, Part II reveals a longstanding, durable commitment to
robust discretionary oversight of banking.
First, it recovers and explicates the AMS. The AMS emerged at
the state level in the 1830s following the collapse of an earlier monetary
order imported from Britain. That order was characterized by the First
and Second Banks of the United States—two federally chartered
corporations that engendered passionate and sustained opposition. The
AMS was a compromise—a way to keep the government from having to
expand the money supply directly without creating overmighty citizens
(like the executives who ran the First and Second Banks). It delegated
monetary powers to thousands of administratively chartered banks.
And to further limit the power of bankers and to manage them, it
pioneered supervision—informal, technocratic, and discretionary
government oversight. During the Civil War, Congress federalized the
AMS, establishing the OCC to charter and oversee a system of “national
banks.” Legislators expected these banks to operate collectively, as a
sort of “Third Bank of the United States.”
In 1913, in response to a half century of monetary breakdowns,
Congress strengthened the AMS by creating the Federal Reserve.
Congress hoped that the Fed would coordinate national banks, extend
federal oversight to state banks, and avert panics. But the Fed failed to
tame state banks, and after the system collapsed in 1933, Congress
again faced calls to nationalize money creation. And again, legislators
chose a middle path—restoring and strengthening the key planks of the
original settlement, especially supervision. They created the FDIC to
explicitly backstop bank money for the first time and to subject state
banks to federal regulation. And they bolstered informal discretionary
oversight by authorizing the Fed to remove bank executives who failed
to heed supervisory directives. The result? Individual lending decisions
by banks are a matter of “private ordering,” but the banking agencies
are empowered to control overall risk levels and fire bankers for unsafe
or unsound practices.
39. Banking, on this view, is a type of “government by contract,” Jody Freeman & Martha
Minnow, Introduction: Reframing the Outsourcing Debates, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT 1 (Jody
Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009), in which the contract is a corporate charter, see WILLIAM
M. FLETCHER, 2 CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 769 (1917) (“It is well
settled that the charter of a corporation is a contract between the state and the corporation.”).

2021]

WHY SUPERVISE BANKS?

961

This hybrid system, widely lauded, was left untouched by the
procedural revolution of the mid-twentieth century. In the 1940s, when
policymakers sought to check excesses in the administrative state, the
banking agencies, despite their “plenary” authority,40 were given a
pass.41 The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (“APA”), which was
the product of these reform efforts, sidestepped supervision by focusing
on formal actions. And, in 1966, Congress made it easier for the agencies
to check banks while avoiding formal proceedings by further expanding
their remedial authorities.42 For example, Congress authorized the
agencies to suspend bankers without judicial process and to order
bankers to cease and desist from engaging in practices the agencies
judged, in their “opinion,” to be “unsafe or unsound.”43
Congress’s commitment to supervision did not stop there. In the
1970s and ’80s, as financial globalization transformed the economy and
a new wave of reformers again reworked the administrative state,
Congress doubled down on iterative, informal bank oversight,
reinforcing supervisory governance in 1978, 1983, and 1989. Even in
2001, when Congress removed structural barriers separating banking
from other financial activities, it strengthened supervision, adding new
approval authorities tied to discretionary agency judgments about the
quality of bank management.44
Contemporary critics are thus, in one key respect, correct:
federal law locates vast power in the hands of the OCC, the Fed, and
the FDIC. But it is a category error to view their exercise of this power
as a form of administrative lawmaking restricting private liberty.
Instead, it is more like government regulating itself 45—which, in the
case of banks, includes the private actors that the government has
recruited to expand the money supply. This outsourcing rationale was
embraced not just by nineteenth-century Treasury secretaries like
Alexander Hamilton, Albert Gallatin, and Salmon P. Chase. Twentieth40. Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v. Douglas, 105 F.2d 100, 104 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
41. See infra notes 280–291 and accompanying text.
42. See infra Section II.C.2.b.
43. See infra Part II. The administrative law critique of bank supervision, by contrast, is
premised on a view of the relationship between the banking agencies and banks that categorizes
the former as public and the latter as private. Cf. Rakoff, supra note 1, at 160 (“[A]dministrators
are government functionaries, not businessmen. They are supposed to set and enforce the rules of
the game, but not to cross the line that separates the public from the private as if they were playing
the game themselves.”). As discussed herein, bank regulation resists this dichotomy because of
banks’ public monetary function. See infra Part II.
44. See infra Section II.C.2.
45. As James Landis put it, when the government acts in a “proprietary” capacity, its actions
are “comparable to rules prescribed by any official in a private industry.” JAMES M. LANDIS, THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 21–22 (1938) (describing the Civil Service Commission, Tennessee
Valley Authority, and Reconstruction Finance Corporation).
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century policymakers like Franklin D. Roosevelt also saw banks as
“agencies” of the government, “supervise[d] [by the government] to see
to it that they conform to certain high standards.”46 Industry complaints
about procedural protections, from this perspective, are an attempt to
upset the terms of the agreement that permits bankers to wield
monetary powers in the first place.47 And the decision by government
officials to turn to “market discipline” in the late 1990s, and to
rulemaking today, conflicts with the basic logic of the AMS—one that
recognizes the public power bankers wield.
Part III attempts to explain why, in the absence of any changes
to the statutory bases of agency authority, the banking agencies have
diluted supervisory methods twice in the past two decades. It rejects as
incomplete explanations focused on capture. It suggests instead that
the problem is structural, and it shows how changes in the theory and
practice of banking law tracked deeper transformations in the political
economy of finance.
Durable supervisory governance depends on more than just
broad agency powers—it requires an alignment between banks and the
banking agencies. This alignment faltered with the rise of “shadow
banking,” monetary expansion by firms without a banking charter (or
corresponding oversight) and “universal banking,” the entrance of
banks into other business lines. Universal banking put supervisors in
the position of overseeing complex businesses that the government has
no special role in administering, leading to calls for the agencies to leave
monitoring to market participants. At the same time, shadow banking
left the agencies unable to oversee, for lack of jurisdiction, keys aspects
of monetary expansion, the very function they were designed to
discipline. These changes also damaged the norms that sustain the
supervisor-banker relationship. Individual banks were once critical
infrastructure. But today, many banks are redundant as conglomerates
operate nationwide. Additionally, the largest banks, with vast legal,
lobbying, and consulting resources at their disposal, are more capable
of resisting supervisory direction and less vulnerable to punishment.
As long as these structural shifts persist, we can expect industry
pressure and conflict between the government and large banks to
continue to threaten supervisory governance. Unfortunately, with one
pillar of the AMS—separations—eroded, supervision has only grown in
46. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, President, U.S., Remarks to the American Bankers
Association 2–3 (Oct. 24, 1934) (emphasis added) (draft available from the Franklin D. Roosevelt
Presidential Library, File No. 745).
47. These complaints are an example of “transparency’s ideological drift”: the use of
transparency arguments to undermine the government’s ability to check private power. David E.
Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, 128 YALE L.J. 100, 102–03 (2018).
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importance. The most recent fortification of our financial system—
stress tests—reflects that. Stress tests sustain what remains of the
AMS. Shortsighted efforts to neuter them and to rely even more on
bright line rules risk renewed instability, future bailouts, and an even
more radical realignment.48
This Article makes several contributions. It unpacks the
theoretical and historical foundations of bank supervision, a distinctive
form of administrative governance. It describes the AMS and reveals
how supervision was designed and strengthened in order to make the
AMS politically and economically durable. It puts banking law theory
and history into dialogue with administrative law.49 It categorizes bank
supervision as a type of administrative law in which the government
acts as an outsourcer rather than as a regulator of private activity.50
48. Although the statutory bases of supervision have been strengthened time and again, all
four pillars have faced pressures before. Separations were eroded in the 1910s and 1920s, and the
government modified delegation and open access in the 1860s, 1910s, 1930s, and 1980s. Some
configurations of the AMS delegate more control over monetary expansion to private hands, others
are more weighted toward government officials. See infra Part II.
49. In doing so, it pursues administrative law pluralism, which is a worldview that used to
be common, but has faded in recent decades. See, e.g., James M. Landis, Crucial Issues in
Administrative Law – The Walter-Logan Bill, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1080 (1940):
Just as the architect follows different conceptions when creating a railroad station and
building a hanger, the administrative agencies we have created have had both their
organization and procedure shaped largely by the tasks with which they were
confronted. It would be silly, for example, to build the same structure for a bank as for
a railroad station; equally absurd is it to insist that the details of organization and
operation of the Federal Communications Commission and the Federal Reserve Board
shall be alike;
LEONARD D. WHITE, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (4th ed. 1955)
(describing various administrative forms and structures from executive departments and
independent regulatory commissions to government corporations); Richard B. Stewart, The
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1670 n.5 (1975)
(emphasizing the importance of differences in agency forms and structures). For an example of
contemporary pluralism that is also applicable to bank supervision, see Charles Sabel, Gary
Herrigel & Peer Hull Kristensen, Regulation Under Uncertainty: The Coevolution of Industry and
Regulation, REGUL. & GOVERNANCE, June 2017, at 2 (examining recursive systems of cooperative
governance designed “to formulate and update detailed plans for risk identification and mitigation
that no central rulemaker could possibly hope to approximate”).
50. It thus deepens efforts to explain the relationship between financial regulation and
administrative law (in the case of the banking agencies). See Note, Cashing Out a Special
Relationship: Trends Toward Reconciliation Between Financial Regulation and Administrative
Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1183, 1185–87 (2017) (examining differences between financial regulation
and other forms of regulation); Gillian E. Metzger, Through the Looking Glass to a Shared
Reflection: The Evolving Relationship Between Administrative Law and Financial Regulation, 78
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129, 144 (2015) (arguing that financial regulation is geared toward enabling
private market activity rather than constraining it); Thomas W. Merrill, A Comment on Metzger
and Zaring: The Quicksilver Problem, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 189, 199 (2015) (arguing that
financial activities are too malleable to restrain through ex ante rulemaking). In doing so, it builds
on recent efforts to recover the role that banks play in the economy. See infra notes 125–127. And
it addresses a longstanding gap in the administrative law literature; even mid-century scholarship
failed to fully account for the distinctiveness of the banking agencies. See infra note 122.
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And it shows why recent challenges to supervision are misplaced and
how efforts by the agencies to “normalize” their methods are
inconsistent with nearly two centuries of practice.
I. TWO APPROACHES TO BANKING LAW
Banking law is theoretically adrift. Most contemporary
scholarship accepts a mistaken view of what banks are and what they
do. I call this view the licensing model. The licensing model casts banks
as garden variety financial intermediaries. A better framework
recognizes that banks are “special”: they create money as well as invest
it. On this view, the banking agencies are outsourcers.
This Part reconstructs the theory of bank regulation immanent
in much of the literature and outlines the outsourcing model. The
outsourcing model recognizes banks’ role in our monetary framework,
the AMS, and grounds the historical recovery that follows.
A. The Licensing Model
This Section examines six ways scholars and practitioners
describe the banking agencies and their method of oversight. Each
implicitly or explicitly embraces a licensing model, treating banks as
privately owned financial intermediaries that borrow from people who
have too much money (savers) and lend to people who don’t have enough
(borrowers).51 The licensing model emphasizes the virtues of private
ordering, downplays the distinctiveness of bank liabilities, and frames
the role of the banking agencies as correcting market failures. It focuses
on the fact that banks, unlike other lenders, are (and should be) subject
to extensive oversight because they are particularly prone to runs.52
These runs are caused by information asymmetries (e.g., bank creditors
do not effectively monitor bank managers)53 and coordination problems
51. See, e.g., RICHARD CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 64–65 (5th ed. 2013) (defining banks as financial intermediaries);
FREDERIC S. MISHKIN, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING & FINANCIAL MARKETS 7–8 (7th ed.
2010) (same and defining financial intermediaries as “institutions that borrow funds from people
who have saved and in turn make loans to others”); Merton H. Miller, Do the M&M Propositions
Apply to Banks?, 19 J. BANKING & FIN. 483, 484–86 (1995) (treating banks as financial
intermediaries). See also Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102
CORNELL L. REV. 1143, 1144–46 (2017) (critiquing the paradigm); Morgan Ricks, Money as
Infrastructure, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 757, 758–64 (2018) (same).
52. See Douglas Diamond & Philip Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91
J. POL. ECON. 401, 401 (1983) (arguing that banks are susceptible to damaging runs).
53. Depositors are bad monitors. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Deposit
Insurance, the Implicit Regulatory Contract, and the Mismatch in the Term Structure of Banks’
Assets and Liabilities, 12 YALE J. ON REGUL. 1, 10–12 (1995); Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen
O’Hara, The Corporate Governance of Banks, 9 FED. RSRV. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 91, 98
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(e.g., bank creditors are numerous and diffuse),54 which government
interventions such as capital regulation and deposit insurance correct
by reducing the likelihood of creditor losses and aligning the incentives
of shareholders and creditors. On the licensing view, the banking
agencies aid in these efforts (and address resulting moral hazard) by
enforcing regulatory rules, facilitating market discipline, preventing
regulatory arbitrage, limiting the government’s financial exposure to
banks, bolstering creditor confidence, and combatting systemic risk. In
other words, bank supervisors act as “rule enforcers,” “discipline
facilitators,” “gap fillers,” “agents” of the Federal Reserve Banks and
the Federal Deposit Insurance Fund, “confidence legitimators,” and
“macroprudential stewards.”55
1. Supervisors as Rule Enforcers
Perhaps the most popular account of the banking agencies goes
like this: Bank balance sheets are complex and opaque, and the
regulatory rulebook is long and technical. A special group of experts is
required to promulgate these bright-line strictures and ensure that
bankers comply with them, so Congress created the banking agencies
and endowed them with “monitoring” powers. 56 Former Fed Governor
Fredric Mishkin takes this view: “The government establishes
(2003). See generally Jonathan R. Macey & Elizabeth H. Garrett, Market Discipline by Depositors:
A Summary of the Theoretical and Empirical Arguments, 5 YALE J. ON REGUL. 215 (1988)
(examining arguments regarding depositor discipline).
54. See Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 52, at 401.
55. This list is not exhaustive. Kris Mitchener and Matthew Jaremski suggest that one of the
roles of the banking agencies is to protect vested interests by blocking new entrants. Kris James
Mitchener & Matthew Jaremski, The Evolution of Bank Supervisory Institutions: Evidence from
American States, 75 J. ECON. HIST. 819, 822–24 (2015). The agencies also sometimes act as
“agricultural extension agents,” diffusing big city wisdom to small-town bankers, and as
“consultants,” conducting horizontal reviews and spreading best practices while guarding trade
secrets. See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 307 (2011)
(explaining that supervisors before the crisis “acted something like consultants, working with
banks to assess the adequacy of their systems”); WILLIAM H. KNIFFIN, JR., THE PRACTICAL WORK
OF A BANK 349 (1915) (“The examiner going from bank to bank acquires a fund of information that
he can use to advantage . . . and can advise the officers in many things to their profit.”). There is
also evidence that in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the banking agencies facilitated
correspondent banking by allowing money center banks to deal in the notes of distant rural outfits.
I have been unable, however, to find any sources asserting that these functions are the purpose of
supervisory law. Cf. Joseph H. Sommer, Why Bail-In? And How!, 20 FED. RSRV. BANK N.Y. ECON.
POL’Y REV. 207, 215 (2014) (suggesting that supervisors may be agents of a bank’s creditors or top
management, auditors, or employees of an “agricultural extension service” for banking).
56. See Rory Van Loo, Regulatory Monitors: Policing Firms in the Compliance Era, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 369, 384–86 (2019) (subsuming bank supervision within ordinary administrative
practice by highlighting its similarities to “regulatory monitoring”). Supervision, as described
herein, involves more than just this sort of monitoring. Many agencies monitor, see id. at 409–10,
including the CFPB, see Levitin, supra note 2, at 355–57, but monitoring alone does not create the
sort of cooperative governance that characterizes banking.
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regulations to reduce [bank] risk taking and then supervisors monitor
banks to see that they are complying with these regulations and not
taking on excessive risk.”57 Roberta Romano similarly describes
supervisors as “adjutants” to the regulatory apparatus “directed at
assessing the adequacy of a bank’s capital” under the Basel Accord.58
And former Fed Chair Ben Bernanke had this “rule enforcers” model in
mind when he explained in 2006 that agency actions are tied “to a
bank’s leverage and risk-based capital ratios.”59
Other commentators adopt the supervisor-as-rule-enforcer
model in part, distinguishing it from the stress-testing approach taken
by supervisors more recently. For example, Peter Conti-Brown writes:
Before the 2008 financial crisis . . . the line between “bank regulation” and “bank
supervision” was relatively easy to summarize. “Regulation” was the rulemaking that
administrative agencies issued pursuant to some statutory authority. “Supervision” was
the micro-application of regulation to individual firms, a kind of check-the-box exercise
that ensured that the supervisors saw in the banks what the regulators wanted them to
see. In other words, the regulators made the rules, and the supervisors made sure the
rules were followed.60

“Rule enforcer” accounts also sometimes highlight the role that
monitoring plays in shaping regulatory rules: because agencies interact

57. Frederic S. Mishkin, Prudential Supervision: Why Is It Important and What Are the
Issues?, in PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION: WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN’T 1, 8 (Frederic S. Mishkin
ed., 2001); see also Heidi Richards, Influence and Incentives in Financial Institution Supervision,
in FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 73, 81 (A. Joanne Kellermann, Jakob de Haan &
Femke de Vries eds., 2013) (explaining that it “is commonly asserted that supervisors mainly
enforce ‘compliance’ with prudential requirements” and that the “prominence of [the] compliance
[view] is evident throughout many pronouncements by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision and similar authorities”).
58. Roberta Romano, For Diversity in the International Regulation of Financial Institutions:
Critiquing and Recalibrating the Basel Architecture, 31 YALE J. ON REGUL. 1, 10 (2014).
59. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Remarks at the
Annual Convention of the American Bankers Association (Oct. 16, 2006) (speech entitled “Bank
Regulation and Supervision: Balancing Benefits and Costs”).
60. Peter Conti-Brown, Stress Tests and the End of Bank Supervision, OXFORD BUS. L. BLOG
(May 8, 2016), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2016/05/stress-tests-and-endbank-supervision [https://perma.cc/Z67Y-ZZW8]. See also PETER CONTI-BROWN, THE POWER AND
INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 164 (2016) (describing supervision as examination
followed by enforcement). Armour et al. give a similar account in their encyclopedic treatment of
financial institutions law, noting that “until the mid-1990s, prudential supervision . . . consisted
primarily of periodic examinations to determine whether banks had complied with applicable
regulatory requirements.” JOHN ARMOUR, DAN AWREY, PAUL DAVIES, LUCA ENRIQUES, JEFFREY N.
GORDON, COLIN MAYER & JENNIFER PAYNE, PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 580 (2016)
(describing this “traditional” approach as emphasizing “technical compliance with prescriptive
rules”); see also A. Joanne Kellermann & Robert H.J. Mosch, Good Supervision and Its Limits in
the Post-Lehman Era, in FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 57, at 1, 5
(explaining that, traditionally, supervisors “concentrated on checking whether [banks were]
meeting the statutory requirements in terms of solvency, liquidity, and controlled business
operations”); MICHAEL BARR, HOWELL JACKSON & MARGARET E. TAHYAR, FINANCIAL REGULATION:
LAW AND POLICY 831–36, 841–49 (2016).
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closely with bank employees, they can glean information that will allow
them to refine their strictures over time.61
2. Supervisors as Discipline Facilitators
But the banking agencies cannot be only rule enforcers, at least
as a matter of statutory design. Title 12 of the U.S. Code specifically
differentiates between violations of law and unsafe and unsound
practices, empowering the banking agencies to take corrective actions
in both cases.62 The Code also repeatedly distinguishes between
supervision and enforcement, treating the former as a distinct
regulatory process.63
Two other approaches better account for the discretionary and
informal practice of bank oversight by accepting the rule enforcers
model as a baseline and refining it. One of these approaches dominated
official accounts of supervision in the run-up to the 2008 crisis. This
framework imagines supervisors as facilitators of market discipline.
Discretionary oversight is necessary, this view holds, because banks are
opaque and agency problems between bank shareholders and bank
managers threaten to undermine financial stability. As Robert Clark
put it, “a financial intermediary’s assets consist of intangible claims,”
which—absent special regulation—“would be easy for the management
of an intermediary to sell . . . and replace . . . with new claims that in
the aggregate constitute a portfolio with a radically different level
of risk.”64
The opacity of bank risk-taking is problematic because, in the
words of former Fed Governor Lawrence Meyer, “markets cannot
operate well without transparency.”65 The “prerequisite for market
discipline” of banks, according to Meyer, “is more rapid dissemination
of information [to the market, and the] provision to market participants
of critical and timely information about risk exposures by the [banks]
themselves.”66 The government must “intervene” to ensure that this
61. See Eisenbach et al., supra note 13, at 21–28.
62. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b). Many policymakers likely subscribe to the “rule enforcers”
view for normative reasons. I call these individuals “rule absolutists.” Menand, supra note 17, at
1584. They oppose discretionary government action on principle because they think it jeopardizes
first-order liberty interests.
63. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1831bb(e); id. § 4806(f)(1) (describing various “supervisory
determinations”). Dan Tarullo catalogues many further examples in forthcoming work.
64. Robert Charles Clark, The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries, 86 YALE L.J. 1, 14–15
(1976) (“[F]inancial intermediaries can shift their aggregate risk levels more readily than
other corporations.”).
65. Laurence H. Meyer, Supervising Large Complex Banking Organizations: Adapting to
Change, in PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION: WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN’T, supra note 57, at 97, 100.
66. Id.
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information reaches market participants because “[p]ublic disclosure is
not going to be easy for bankers [as] it may well bring new pressures
that [managers] may not like in the short run.”67
On this view, the banking agencies are empowered to
“independently test and compare systems and models to best practices”
and “review[ ] [bank] disclosures to confirm that . . . [a] bank’s actual
disclosures are consistent with its own policy.”68 Safety and soundness
authority and informal, iterative engagement allow the agencies to both
enforce regulatory rules and strengthen “private regulation.”69 The Fed,
under the leadership of Alan Greenspan, made this sort of marketoriented oversight official policy in the late 1990s and dubbed it “riskfocused supervision” (“RFS”).70
Many subsequent commentators depict RFS as a salutary
advance from what they assume preceded it: a pure rule-enforcement
model. Others suggest that facilitating market discipline has always
been the purpose of supervisory law.71 According to the latter group, the
point of the Fed’s postcrisis stress tests is (or should be) to enhance
transparency so that the market can identify weaknesses and force
banks to correct them.72 As will become clear, such approaches leave

67. Id. at 102.
68. Id. at 99, 102.
69. Id. Meyer’s model rests on Greenspan’s diktat that, since the “self-interest of market
participants generates private market regulation,” the “real question” for government “is not
whether a market should be regulated,” but “whether government intervention strengthens or
weakens private regulation.” Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys.,
Remarks at the Financial Markets Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta:
Government Regulation and Derivatives Contracts (Feb. 21, 1997).
70. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM:
PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 63 (9th ed. 2005) (“The goal of the risk-focused supervision process is to
identify the greatest risks to a banking organization and assess the ability of the organization’s
management to identify, measure, monitor, and control these risks.”); see also Eisenbach et al.,
supra note 13, at 9 (identifying the advent of RFS in the 1990s). RFS was designed to complement
capital regulations promulgated in the late 1980s and 1990s. Greenspan and Meyer designed these
regulations to address, in Greenspan’s words, the “needs for larger shock absorbers and for
increased private incentives to monitor and control [bank] risk.” Alan Greenspan, Innovation and
Regulation of Banks in the 1990s, 74 FED. RSRV. BULL. 783, 784 (1988).
71. For example, Mitchener and Jaremski argue that supervision lessens “asymmetric
information . . . by providing [an] independent collaboration of accounting information and by
checking for management fraud.” Mitchener & Jaremski, supra note 55, at 835. On their account,
supervision evolved to “promote product and price competition and to enforce legal restrictions on
bank activity.” Id. Eugene White argues that facilitating market discipline was the original
purpose of federal supervision and bemoans the shift toward government policing post-1913. See
Eugene N. White, Lessons from the History of Bank Examination and Supervision in the United
States, 1863-2008, in FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION IN THE WAKE OF FINANCIAL CRISES 15, 18,
38–39 (Alfredo Gigliobianco & Gianni Toniolo eds., 2009) (arguing that, until 1913, “supervision
[was] primarily aimed at reinforcing market discipline”).
72. See, e.g., Li Lian Ong & Ceyla Pazarbasioglu, Credibility and Stress Testing, 2 INT’L J.
FIN. STUD. 15, 17 (2014) (“The stress tests should usefully inform markets about the risks
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parts of the law unexplained, including its emphasis on supervisory
secrecy and its panoply of remedial sanctions. Moreover, these
approaches are historically ungrounded—inconsistent with not only the
legislative history of Title 12, but also with agency practice prior to
Greenspan’s tenure.73
3. Supervisors as Gap-Fillers
A third model of supervision conceives of safety and soundness
as a “gap-filling principle”74 and supervision as “the regulatory gapfiller.”75 “Congress left it to the agencies,” Heidi Mandanis Schooner
explains, “to decide what practices are unsafe or unsound,” because
safety and soundness law is designed “to close the gaps in the regulatory
framework.”76 As banking is highly complex, “neither Congress nor the
federal banking agencies could (or should) attempt to regulate
specifically each and every bank activity.”77 It would be “prohibitively
costly” to write all these rules and, given how fast things change, not
likely to work.78
On this view, supervision complements rule writing, which is
backward-looking, because supervision allows the banking agencies to
make law ex post at the point of application. For example, it allows the
agencies to deem a specific bank investment “unsafe and unsound” even
if the investment complies with the rules. Many observers who argue
Congress created the agencies to enforce bright-line rules contend that,
in recent years, supervisors have become more focused on using their
authority to close holes in the regulatory framework.79

associated with the banks . . . .”); Giovanni Petrella & Andrea Resti, Supervisors as Information
Producers: Do Stress Tests Reduce Bank Opaqueness?, 37 J. BANKING & FIN. 5406 (2013).
73. See, e.g., Gerald Dunne, The Legal Basis of Bank Supervision, in BANK SUPERVISION 6,
8–9 (1963) (explaining that the “widespread consequences of misconduct or bad judgment” at a
bank “are such as to require governmental rather than market sanction”).
74. Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Fiduciary Duties’ Demanding Cousin: Bank Director Liability
for Unsafe or Unsound Banking Practices, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 175, 188 (1995).
75. Id. at 187.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 187–88; see also PAUL TUCKER, UNELECTED POWER: THE QUEST FOR LEGITIMACY IN
CENTRAL BANKING AND THE REGULATORY STATE 469 (2018) (“[F]inance is a shape shifter.
Regulatory arbitrage is endemic, and the rule writers can end up chasing their tails.”).
79. See, e.g., ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 60, at 582:
[Supervision, with its emphasis on] discretion and judgment . . . is a reflection of both
the resource constraints faced by regulators and the reality that it is simply unrealistic
to expect them to write—or, crucially, to update on a timely basis—a prudential
rulebook capable of prescribing the most desirable course of action in every potential
future state of the world in which market participants may find themselves;
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Although I have not seen it in any of the literature,80 one could
imagine a law and economics explanation for supervision that proceeds
along these lines: The problem with banking is that banks cannot devise
verifiable debt covenants (ones for which a breach can be proven in a
courtroom). A small nonverifiable change in volatility, easily adopted in
finance, can change the risk profile of a high-leverage business like a
bank dramatically. As private bank creditors cannot be expected to
provide extra-corporate governance, the solution is a form of contingent
governance—government supervision—with the power to intervene
even in the absence of verifiable events.
The “gap-filler” model might also be flipped on its head. To
address rule incompleteness, the government could be said to
intentionally overregulate banks, using the banking agencies to
selectively waive requirements after the fact. In other words,
supervision might reflect the need for what Jason Scott Johnston calls,
in the retail products context, “tailored forgiveness”—the ability to
reward those who behave non-opportunistically.81 I am not aware of
anyone who has made this argument for supervision in banking,82 but
there is support for it in practice.83
4. Supervisors as Agents of the Fund and Reserve Banks
All three of the abovementioned theories treat bright-line rules
as the foundation of banking law and treat the agencies as enforcing
those rules in one way or another. But they miss that many of the rules,
including modern capital requirements, grew out of supervisory
guidance issued in the 1980s.84 That guidance was designed to clarify
official expectations during a period of declining bank profitability so
that banks would not be surprised by cease and desist orders. 85 Indeed,

A. Joanne Kellermann & Robert H.J. Mosch, Good Supervision and Its Limits in the Post-Lehman
Era, in FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 57, at 1, 5 (arguing that
supervision must shift to “tackle the possible root causes of later problems before they even
translate into deteriorating solvency and liquidity ratios”).
80. But see infra notes 99–100 (articulating a related theory).
81. Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How StandardForm Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses and Consumers, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 857, 879 (2006).
82. Kenneth Abraham argues that the need to engage in “tailored forgiveness” might be one
reason why governments choose not to act as insurers. Kenneth Abraham, Four Conceptions of
Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 687 (2013).
83. Indeed, “regulatory forbearance” in the 1980s raised so many concerns that Congress
actually restricted the power of the banking agencies to ignore certain rule violations. See 12
U.S.C. § 1831o (requiring banking agencies to take “prompt corrective action”).
84. See Menand, supra note 17, at 1551–52.
85. See id. at 1561–62.
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it was only subsequent policy changes that led scholars to see
supervision as a gap-filler instead of rules as a fail-safe.
A fourth theory stands out from these approaches by
emphasizing the government’s role in banking. This theory attributes
informal, discretionary oversight to the fact that (1) the FDIC insures
most bank liabilities, making the FDIC, in effect, every bank’s primary
creditor and (2) the Federal Reserve Banks extend discount window
loans and intraday credits to banks to facilitate payments, accepting
transfers of bank deposits as money. Supervisors, on this view, are
agents of the Fund and of the Reserve Banks—government bodies in
privity with the banks. Supervisors’ broad powers minimize the
government’s financial exposure to banks and protect the government’s
contractual rights; private market actors with similarly large
contingent claims, the thinking goes, would demand similar authority.
Richard Carnell, Jonathan Macey, and Geoffrey Miller advance
this view in their textbook.86 And officials sometimes speak about
supervision in this manner.87 Statutory support for this interpretation
can be found in section 21 of the Federal Reserve Act, which provides
that “examinations shall be so conducted as to inform the Federal
reserve bank of the condition of its member banks and of the lines of
credit which are being extended by them.”88 But, as discussed shortly,
this view overlooks the purpose of the Fed’s lending programs and the
Insurance Fund, and it does not grapple with the establishment of the
OCC during the Civil War or the subsequent development of
supervisory law in the 1960s, ’70s, and ’80s.89
5. Supervisors as Confidence Legitimators
A fifth theory emphasizes the role of supervisors in promoting
market confidence. According to this view, the banking agencies have

86. CARNELL ET AL., supra note 51, at 440 (“[D]eposit insurance . . . gave supervision a new
rationale: protecting the insurance funds. Now the bank supervisor acts, in a sense, as agent for
the fund.”); see also TUCKER, supra note 78, at 448, 459 (advancing a similar view).
87. Narayana Kocherlakota, Speech at the Allied Executives Business & Economic Outlook
Symposium: The Economy and Why the Federal Reserve Needs to Supervise Banks (Mar. 2, 2010)
(arguing that supervision is necessary because if the “Federal Reserve makes a bad
loan . . . through the discount window, that loss appears on its balance sheet”).
88. Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-43, § 21, 38 Stat. 251, 272 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); see also The Federal Reserve Act, December 23, 1913,
reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF BANKING AND C URRENCY IN THE UNITED STATES 2436,
2465–66 (Herman E. Krooss & Paul A. Samuelson eds., 1969).
89. Nor can it account for the Federal Home Loan Banks, which provide liquidity to banks to
support housing finance and take much greater risk in their dealings with banks despite having
no supervisory powers. See Kathryn Judge, Three Discount Windows, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 795,
821–27 (2014).
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extensive powers so that they can credibly provide a governmental
stamp of approval to prevent skittish depositors and other bank
creditors from withdrawing their deposits during periods of economic
uncertainty. Carnell, Macey, and Miller describe a version of this theory
in their textbook,90 without fully subscribing to it,91 and a similar logic
suffuses some recent assessments of the Fed’s postcrisis stress testing
regime.92 Anne Khademian, in a monograph focused on supervisory
autonomy and accountability, also adopts this framework.93
Although there are superficial similarities between the
“confidence legitimator” and “market discipline” views (both, for
example, are oriented toward private markets), the two in fact sit in
tension. After all, if confidence is the goal of supervision, problems at
banks are best worked out in private, between agency officials and bank
executives. Secrecy is a virtue because it helps obscure weaknesses that
might undermine trust in banks. By contrast, if market discipline is the
goal, secrecy is a sin because it prevents market actors from policing
bad practices. The government should advertise information about
bank weaknesses so that bankers are incentivized to address them.
Current law is more consistent with the confidence-legitimator
view as it shields material information about banks from the market
through the common law bank examiners’ privilege,94 statutory
provisions exempting supervisors from the Freedom of Information
Act,95 and regulations requiring banks and supervisors to treat
90. CARNELL ET AL., supra note 51, at 440 (explaining that before deposit insurance,
“supervision played a crucial role in preventing runs” and that, in that regard, “[p]erception
mattered as much as reality” because “if the public believed that banks were strictly supervised,
it would be less likely to lose confidence in a bank at the first ugly rumor of problems”). Mitchener
and Jaremski also argue supervision might be necessary because depositors are “[u]nable to
discern if bank managers [take] on too much risk or [are] committing fraud,” so, absent a
government stamp of approval, “would be reluctant to put money in the bank.” Mitchener &
Jaremski, supra note 55, at 835.
91. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 51, at 440.
92. See Ong & Pazarbasioglu, supra note 72, at 16 (emphasizing the importance of stress
tests as a way to build credibility). Supervisory stress tests are necessary, on this view, not to
enable the agencies to identify weak banks and force them to take corrective actions, but to signal
to the market that the banks are trustworthy counterparties. Id.
93. ANNE M. KHADEMIAN, CHECKING ON BANKS: AUTONOMY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THREE
FEDERAL AGENCIES 29 (1996) (“Banking is a business of risk that depends on depositor and
investor confidence. The examination profession must facilitate that confidence by restricting risks
that threaten safety . . . .”).
94. See, e.g., Martinez v. Rocky Mountain Bank, 540 F. App’x 846, 854 (10th Cir. 2013)
(recognizing the bank examination privilege); Eric B. Epstein, Why the Bank Examination
Privilege Doesn’t Work as Intended, 35 YALE J. ON REGUL. BULL. 17, 18 n.4 (2017) (“[T]he bank
examination privilege is recognized in every federal circuit.”).
95. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8) (exempting information “contained in or related to examination,
operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible
for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions”); see also Pub. Invs. Arb. Bar Ass’n v.
SEC, 930 F. Supp. 2d 55, 64 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d, 771 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he primary reason
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supervisory work product as government property.96 The bread and
butter of modern supervisory oversight—the MRA—is never released to
the public nor are annual agency assessments of bank health, including
the composite scores that agencies calculate and which determine
whether banks can distribute capital to their shareholders.97
6. Supervisors as Macroprudential Stewards
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, a sixth way of
conceptualizing the banking agencies emerged, one that highlights
system-level fragilities, moral hazard, and the government’s tendency
to recapitalize banks when they get in trouble. This view treats markets
and rules as perhaps sufficient to ensure microprudential soundness—
the solvency of individual banks. But it holds that the state also has a
special interest in macroprudential stability, an interest that requires
and justifies discretionary government oversight of banks and other
financial institutions that pose “systemic” risks.98
As Mathias Dewatripont, Jean-Charles Rochet, and Jean
Tirole explain:
The only way of breaking the vicious circle of recurrent banking crises, fed by phases of
speculative mania, is to give the agencies in charge of banking supervision the power to

for adoption of exemption 8 was to ensure the security of financial institutions. Specifically, there
was [a] concern that [the] disclosure of . . . reports containing frank evaluations of . . . banks might
undermine public confidence and cause unwarranted runs on banks.” (citation omitted) (quoting
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Heimann, 589 F.2d 531, 534 (1978))); S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 9
(1965) (“Exemption No. 8 is directed specifically to insuring the security of our financial
institutions by making available only to the Government agencies . . . examination, operating, or
condition reports . . . .”).
96. See 12 C.F.R. § 4.32(b) (2020) (defining “[n]on-public OCC information” to include
materials related to examinations and supervisory activities); id. § 261.2(c)(1)(iii) (defining
“[c]onfidential supervisory information” for the Fed to include documents prepared in connection
with supervisory activities); id. § 309.5(g)(8) (defining “[e]xempt information” for the FDIC to
include examination materials).
97. Perhaps unsurprisingly, those who think that supervisors should facilitate market
discipline are eager to remove these restrictions. See, e.g., Guidance, Supervisory Expectations,
and the Rule of Law, supra note 2, at 3 (arguing that the scope of restricted supervisory
information should “be narrowed to the core minimum necessary”); see also Alfred Dennis
Mathewson, From Confidential Supervision to Market Discipline: The Role of Disclosure in the
Regulation of Commercial Banks, 11 J. CORP. L. 139, 176 (1986) (arguing that “public disclosure”
of bank regulatory information “must be systematic and continuous”).
98. See generally Robert Hockett, The Macroprudential Turn: From Institutional ‘Safety and
Soundness’ to Systemic ‘Financial Stability’ in Financial Supervision, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 201,
204 (2015) (explaining that a focus on “financial stability” is a hallmark of macroprudential policy).
The idea that supervisors have a system-wide mandate has pre-crisis roots. See TUCKER, supra
note 78, at 446; George Blunden, Deputy Governor, Bank of Eng., Supervision and Central
Banking (April 8, 1987), in BANK ENG. Q. BULL., Aug. 1987, at 380–85 (“It is part of the
[supervisor’s] job to take [a] wider, systemic view and sometimes to curb practices which even
prudent banks might, if left to themselves, regard as safe.”).
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take charge of troubled banks before they really endanger the funds of their small
depositors and/or the stability of the financial system. 99

In other words, “shareholders must be open to expropriation, and
managers must be dismissed before” banks default.100
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, signed into law in 2010, reflects this approach. For example, it
creates the Financial Stability Oversight Council to extend Fed
supervision to nonbank financial companies that pose systemic risks,101
and it sets up a bank-like, government-imposed resolution process for
nonbank financial institutions whose failure might jeopardize financial
stability.102 The Fed’s annual stress tests can also be justified on these
grounds, as they are explicitly geared toward protecting the economy
from an undercapitalized banking system.
B. The Outsourcing Model
Although the abovementioned theories accurately describe
many aspects of supervisory practice, none are wholly consistent with
the design of the banking agencies. Even the agent model, which
highlights the government’s special role, casts the government as just
another market actor in the banking system.103 The actual relationship
between the state and the banking system is closer to the reverse: banks
are government instrumentalities with private managers acting in a
public capacity. This becomes clear if one recognizes that banks are
more than just lenders with unusually volatile funding. Banks create
money as well as invest it. Once money creation in addition to
investment is recognized, the banking system is better conceived of as
an outsourcing scheme: (1) banks expand the money supply (2) on

99. MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT, JEAN-CHARLES ROCHET & JEAN TIROLE, BALANCING THE BANKS:
GLOBAL LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 74 (Keith Tribe trans., 2010). This argument
resembles, in part, Leonard White’s view that legislatures created bank commissions because the
right to sue an insolvent bank is an empty protection. WHITE, supra note 49, at 464 (“Preventive,
not punitive, measures were required, and these could be taken only by the executive branch,
through administrative agencies armed with inquisitorial and other powers.”). See also TUCKER,
supra note 78, at 68 (explaining that after a banking collapse, “the losers are never going to be
able to recover their costs from the ‘financial polluters’ because the banks and other intermediaries
are bust,” and accordingly, “[s]tability warrants state intervention to reduce the probability of
crises and to limit how bad they are”).
100. DEWATRIPONT ET AL., supra note 99, at 74.
101. 12 U.S.C. § 5323.
102. Id. § 5383.
103. See supra Section I.A.4.
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behalf of the government and (3) the banking agencies act as
franchisors by chartering banks and supervising their work.
1. Banks as Monetary Institutions
Banks do not simply lend; when they lend, they create money.104
Indeed, government-chartered banks create most of the money in the
economy (and, as we will see, this is by design). Although the Treasury
Department prints—and the Federal Reserve System issues—the cash
in your wallet,105 households and businesses use little cash as a means
of payment or store of value. Instead, they rely primarily on promises
to pay cash issued by banks—exchanging them as if they were cash.
This “bank money” (also known as “inside money”) can take many
forms.106 In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the most common
form of it was physical paper called “bank notes”; today, it is bank
account balances called “deposits,” “checkbook money,” or “account
money.”107 Deposits are a “credit” on the books of a bank that serve as
a store of value and a means of payment.108 Banks create deposits by

104. N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MACROECONOMICS 347 (5th ed. 2009) (“[B]anks
create money.”); see also MERVYN KING, THE END OF ALCHEMY 104 (2016). This understanding was
once shared across disciplines. See, e.g., BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA:
FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 39 (1957) (“[I]t is the function of banks to create
money . . . .”). And it is returning to the financial stability literature. See, e.g., GARY GORTON,
MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES 10–11 (2012); MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM:
RETHINKING FINANCIAL REGULATION 101, 162–63 (2016) (“[B]anking is first and foremost a
monetary activity.”); KATHARINA PISTOR, THE CODE OF CAPITAL: HOW THE LAW CREATES WEALTH
AND INEQUALITY 77–107 (2019).
105. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 411, 418 (empowering the Fed to issue Federal reserve notes). The
Treasury Department also issues coins through the U.S. Mint. See 31 U.S.C. § 5131 (providing for
the organization of the U.S. Mint); id. § 5111 (empowering the Treasury secretary to issue coins).
106. There is no bright line separating money-issuers from non-money-issuers, as very shortterm debts serve certain monetary functions. See RICKS, supra note 104, at 29–62; Robin
Greenwood, Samuel Hanson & Jeremy Stein, The Federal Reserve’s Balance Sheet as a Financial
Stability Tool, ECON. POL’Y SYMP. PROC. 335, 347–55 (2016) (calculating the “moneyness”
premium); see also JOHN M. KEYNES, GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY
166–70 (1936) (explaining that we should draw the line between “money” and “debts” at whatever
point is most convenient for handling a particular problem).
107. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, A LEGAL HISTORY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES 35, 50
(1971) (discussing the increased use of bank deposits relative to bank notes).
108. PAUL SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 228 (13th ed. 1989) (explaining
that deposits are money “like any other medium of exchange. Being payable on demand, [deposits]
serve[ ] as money in the same sense that 1000 dollar bills do”); id. at 227 (explaining further that
“today is the age of bank money” and that “[i]f we calculate the total dollar amount of transactions,
nine-tenths take place by bank money, the rest by paper money”); MANKIW, supra note 104, at 84
(explaining that “[a] second type of asset used for transactions is demand deposits, the funds people
hold in their checking accounts,” which “are therefore added to [cash] currency when measuring
the quantity of money”); Geoffrey P. Miller, Essential Papers on the Economics of Financial Law 7
(N.Y.U. L. & Econ. Rsch. Paper Series, Paper No. 16-01, 2016) (“The deposit account is a form of
private money created by the bank.”).
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crediting accounts (using the “bookkeeper’s pen” 109) when they originate
loans. In other words, banks lend to account holders by plussing up
their balances.110
Today, only the Federal Reserve circulates paper notes—and
they are no longer redeemable for gold and silver coins.111 But privately
owned (publicly chartered) banks still have a legal monopoly on account
money. And given the dominance of this form of money in everyday life,
deposits are what counts. Banks can expand the supply of account
money, triggering inflation, or contract the supply of account money,
triggering deflation, regardless of how much cash the Fed puts into
circulation. Indeed, the only way that cash enters circulation is through
banks when depositors withdraw it. Although borrowers can normally
redeem account money for cash, banks hold little cash on hand, and the
total supply of it (around $1.8 trillion) represents a fraction of
outstanding deposit balances ($15 trillion).112
2. Minting as Governing
One way to conceptualize money creation is as a special province
of the state.113 There are many reasons to adopt this view (although

109. Milton Friedman, The Euro-Dollar Market: Some First Principles, 7 FED. RSRV. BANK OF
ST. LOUIS 16, 17 (1971).
110. See, e.g., ALBERT GALLATIN, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE CURRENCY AND BANKING S YSTEM
OF THE UNITED STATES 31 (1831) (“[B]ank notes and deposits rest precisely on the same basis . . .
we cannot therefore but consider the aggregate amount of credits payable on demand, standing on
the books of the several banks, as being part of the currency of the United States.”); JOSEPH
SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 1081, 1114–16 (1954) (noting “the obvious truth
that deposits and banknotes are fundamentally the same thing”). Contra Schumpeter and
Gallatin, there are differences between deposits and notes. Payments by check, for example, rely
primarily on the credit of the payor and the payee’s bank, and the payee is in privity with both. By
contrast, a payment by note relies entirely on the credit of a third party, often unknown to either
the payor or the payee.
111. See infra Section II.C; HURST, supra note 107, at 180–81.
112. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Deposits, All Commercial Banks, FRED: FED.
RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DPSACBW027SBOG (last visited Dec.
12, 2020) [https://perma.cc/E5EQ-9WQL].
113. There are other ways. See, e.g., GEORGE SELGIN, MONEY: FREE AND UNFREE (2017)
(treating governments as interlopers in private monetary arrangements); FREDRICH HAYEK, THE
DENATIONALIZATION OF MONEY 12 (1976) (offering “the revolutionary proposal to replace state
control of the money supply by competing private issuers in the market”); LUDWIG VON MISES, THE
THEORY OF MONEY AND CREDIT 435–57 (1912) (proposing a “return to sound [non-state] money”).
On a market theory of money, money is conventional and a state is not needed to create it. See,
e.g., JOHN HICKS, THE MARKET THEORY OF MONEY (1989). This view is traceable chiefly to John
Locke. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 56–66 (1690); JOHN LOCKE, SOME
CONSIDERATIONS ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF LOWERING OF INTEREST AND RAISING THE VALUE OF
MONEY (1691); see also CHRISTINE DESAN, MAKING MONEY: COINS, CURRENCY, AND THE COMING
OF CAPITALISM 330–59 (2014) (discussing the influence of John Locke).
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adopting it is not critical for the historical recovery that follows).114
These reasons include its doctrinal pedigree,115 its constitutional
status,116 and its theoretical underpinnings.117 But let me offer two
further reasons.118
First, whatever one thinks about the power to issue money
generally, the power to issue money denominated in the state’s unit of
account is very much the state’s concern. For example, the federal
government uses the dollar119 and issues monetary instruments
denominated in dollars. Other entities that issue instruments
114. It suffices to say that this is how most of the legislators who wrote our banking laws and
forged the AMS understood banking.
115. Recognition of the sovereign’s authority over money is as old as the Anglo-American legal
tradition itself. See DESAN, supra note 113, at 93 (“The Anglo-Saxon rule that ‘there shall run one
coinage throughout the realm’ date[s] to the reign of Athelstan in 930.”). The Privy Council sitting
as the highest court in England and Ireland decided the canonical case in 1605. See The Case of
Mixed Money in Ireland, Trin. 2 JAMES I. A.D. 1605, reprinted in COBBETT’S COMPLETE
COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 114–30, 118 (1809) (“[T]he King by his prerogative may make money
of what matter and form he pleaseth, and establish the standard of it, so may he change his money
in substance and impression, and enhance or debase the value of it, or entirely decry and annul
it.”); id. at 116 (no other person, the Council noted, could make money “without special license or
commandment of the king”). The Supreme Court adopted the Privy Council’s holding in 1871. Knox
v. Lee, 79 U.S. 457, 565–66 (1871) (noting that “the power given to Congress to coin money and
regulate the value thereof . . . [was] much discussed in the great case of Mixed Moneys . . . and it
was there held to belong to the king’s ordinary prerogative over the coinage of money,” and that,
in the United States, whether the standard of money should be changed is “undoubtedly” a
question of “legislative discretion”); see also Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. 533, 549 (1869)
(upholding a prohibitive tax on state bank notes); Ling Su Fan v. United States, 218 U.S. 302, 310
(1910) (“The power to ‘coin money and regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin,’ is a
prerogative of sovereignty and a power exclusively vested in the Congress of the United States.”);
Norman v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 304 (1935) (“[T]here attaches to the ownership of
gold and silver those limitations which public policy may require by reason of their quality as legal
tender and as a medium of exchange.” (citing Ling Su Fan, 218 U.S. at 310)).
116. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5 (“Congress shall have [the] Power . . . To coin Money [and]
regulate the Value thereof.”); id. § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . coin Money; emit Bills of Credit;
make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any . . . Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 361 (Alexander Hamilton)
(George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001) (“[The King] is in several respects the arbiter of
commerce, and in this capacity can . . . coin money [and] authorize or prohibit the circulation of
foreign coin.”). In the eighteenth century, the verb “to coin” meant “to make or forge any thing”
and it was common to speak of “coining” paper money. See Robert G. Natelson, Paper Money and
the Original Understanding of the Coinage Clause, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1017, 1062–63,
1063 n.282 (2008) (collecting two dozen examples).
117. See Robert C. Hockett, Rousseauvian Money 14 (Cornell Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper Series,
Paper No. 18-48, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3278408 [https://perma.cc/V3BP-TXHG]. It also
seems likely that successful moneys, including money issued by nonstate actors, are the product
of state power and its monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. See GEORG FRIEDRICH KNAPP,
THE STATE THEORY OF MONEY 1 (1905) (arguing that money is a creation of the state); GEOFFREY
INGHAM, THE NATURE OF MONEY 74–80 (2004) (similar); see also MILTON FRIEDMAN, A PROGRAM
FOR MONETARY STABILITY 8 (1960) (arguing that money provision is “an essential governmental
function on a par with the provision of a stable legal framework”).
118. I develop these points in two works in progress: “Why Private Money Is Bad (and What
to Do About It)” and “Administering Money: The Federal Reserve System in Theory and Practice.”
119. 31 U.S.C. § 5101.
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denominated in dollars (like banks) debase the value of dollars issued
by the United States to the extent that the dollars they issue are used
to satisfy dollar demand in the economy. For example, prices would be
much lower if there were only $1.8 trillion in circulation (i.e., if people
did not write bank checks denominated in dollars) because people who
wanted to hold their wealth in dollars would have to get their hands on
cash issued by the government. Since most governments rely on their
money to tax and spend, private activity that changes the value of
government-issued money poses a significant risk.120
Second, the power to create money in a monetary economy, one
in which most goods and services and tangible and intangible assets
have prices, is the power to govern the motions of economic life. For
example, when a borrower comes to a bank to finance a new venture,
the bank is not constrained by the amount of cash that already exists.
The bank can empower the borrower to requisition the necessary social
resources by creating new money instruments out of thin air. This sort
of governing power has long been of central concern to states, which
have generally constrained the sorts of projects that can be financed in
this way (and constrained the amount of money banks can create) in an
effort to direct this power toward certain ends.121
3. Supervisors as Outsourcers
If we recognize banks’ role as the primary source of monetary
elasticity, and the government’s explicit and implicit backstopping of
the money banks issue, banking law figures as an elaborate outsourcing
scheme. Agency authority is broad because banks are franchisees and
supervisors are franchisors. Yes, the franchisors enforce rules, fill gaps,
legitimate confidence, mitigate moral hazard, and combat
macroprudential risks. But the franchisors perform these functions
because the government is the proprietor of the system, governing
through banks to expand the money supply. And the robust scope of
supervisory power—the ability of the banking agencies to enter banks
uninvited, direct bank activities, and remove bank officers and
directors—follows from the fact that banks are not purely private
businesses but premodern independent agencies operated by private
actors. This perspective renders legible many aspects of the statutory
120. See Lev Menand, Regulate Virtual Currencies as Currency, JUST MONEY (Feb. 14,
2020), https://justmoney.org/l-menand-regulate-virtual-currencies-as-currency [https://perma.cc/
WW8Y-MZRR] (cataloging harms caused by virtual currencies).
121. Seen in this light, safety and soundness oversight of banks by government officials is an
area where the government has long practiced the principles of “law and macroeconomics”—using
discretion to loosen (or tighten) restrictions on banks in response to economic conditions. See YAIR
LISTOKIN, LAW AND MACROECONOMICS: LEGAL REMEDIES TO RECESSIONS (2019).
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framework including the Insurance Fund and the Discount Window.
These programs are best understood not as special subsidies to business
organizations, but as efforts to administer a bank-money system by
explicitly backing bank money.
Although most of the legislators who designed our banking
system subscribed to this outsourcing model, it is rarely mentioned in
the contemporary literature.122 One exception is a short 1978 article by
a lawyer in private practice who noted that banking is “an instrument
of government, a means through which governmental policy is
executed.”123 Another is Willard Hurst’s 1971 legal history of money,
which described bank charters as “statutory franchises” that confer
“special privileges to issue circulating currency and place[ ] [banks]
under legal regulation of their finances unlike any imposed on the
general run of business.” 124 There is also the important recent work of

122. It is also curiously absent from the mid-twentieth century administrative law literature,
despite the fact that this literature recognized supervision’s distinctiveness. See, e.g., Davis, infra
note 293, at 713 (“The banking agencies of the federal government have long maintained systems
of secret evidence, secret law, and secret policy.”); Kenneth C. Davis, Administrative Powers of
Supervising, Prosecuting, Advising, Declaring, and Informally Adjudicating, 63 HARV. L. REV. 193,
194 (1949) (defining the “supervising power” and comparing supervision of banks with FCC
supervision of radio programs and SEC supervision of registration statements). Instead, scholars
during this period justified banking law either by reference to its long history or the difficulty of
addressing the consequences of bad banking through formal procedures. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra
note 29, at 155–57. James Landis, for example, recognized the OCC’s unusual power but did not
attempt to explain it—noting only that there is no judicial review if the agency decides to publicize
reports of bank condition even though the consequences for banks are “truly significant.” Landis,
supra note 49, at 1084. Landis omitted the banking agencies from THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
(1938) and his REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT (1960). Leonard
White observed that early state banking laws served as a basis for railroad, gas, and electricity
regulation, see Leonard White, The Origin of Utility Commissions in Massachusetts, 29 J. POL.
ECON. 177, 177, 190 (1921), but adopted a licensing view of bank oversight, see WHITE, supra note
49, at 464, and ignored the federal banking agencies almost entirely, see WHITE, supra note 49, at
126. Despite the OCC’s pivotal importance in the development of the federal administrative state,
White devotes just a sentence to the organization in his chapter on the Treasury Department in
THE REPUBLICAN ERA: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 1869-1901, at 114–15 (1958). Even
James Freedman stretched to account for supervisory power in his treatment of informal
administrative processes. JAMES FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 211–32 (1978) (arguing that the government can act
summarily in banking to protect the public against injury, a version of White’s theory, supra note
49, at 464). See also FREEDMAN, supra, at 219 (“Appointment of a conservator can effectively
protect the interests of depositors and creditors and of the banking institution only if it can be
done summarily.”).
123. Roy T. Englert, Bank Supervision in Historical Perspective, 34 BUS. LAW. 1659,
1662 (1979).
124. HURST, supra note 107, at 31. Some scholars acknowledge a monetary motive for bank
oversight, while adhering to a licensing model. See, e.g., RICHARD S. GROSSMAN, UNSETTLED
ACCOUNT: THE EVOLUTION OF BANKING IN THE INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD SINCE 1800, at 132, 229–
45 (2010).
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Bob Hockett and Saule Omarova,125 Christine Desan,126 and Morgan
Ricks,127 all of whom adopt a “money view” of banking. But none of this
work connects bank supervision as a distinct mode of governance to the
franchise nature of banking or reveals the role that the outsourcing
model played in the genesis of banking law.128 It is to that task that this
Article now turns.
II. BUILDING THE AMERICAN MONETARY SETTLEMENT
For most of American history, legislators, administrators, and
judges understood bank supervision to be a distinct, necessary, and
legitimate mode of governance. Underlying their understanding was a
recognition that banks—because they create the money supply—are
more like premodern independent agencies than private businesses.
Discretionary oversight of banks by special government officials
comprised a constant and critical element of what I call the AMS, an
institutional arrangement that has endured for over 150 years.
The AMS was substantially forged at three critical moments:
1838, 1863, and 1933. This Part revisits these moments in order to
illuminate the intellectual, legal, and political conditions that made the
AMS and supervision possible. Section II.A examines the emergence of
the AMS in antebellum state law. In the 1830s and 1840s, New York
paired open-access outsourcing with informal, strict oversight by
special government officials. Section II.B explains how the New York
model went national, as Congress copied it in 1863 and used it to design
the OCC and the Fed. Section II.C follows the story from the New Deal
to the present day, revealing how Congress created the FDIC and
expanded the powers of all three banking agencies decade after decade
so that the agencies could adjust bank activities without resorting to
formal legal process. Time and again, Congress sustained and
125. Hockett and Omarova explicitly analogize financial firms to franchisees, but they apply
the concept to all financial firms as a matter of normative theory. Hockett & Omarova, supra note
51. On their view, the entire financial system can be conceptualized in outsourcing terms. See
Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, “Special,” Vestigial, or Visionary? What Bank Regulation
Tells Us About the Corporation—and Vice Versa, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 453, 453–54 (2016).
126. Desan situates banks within a millennium of Anglo-American monetary history,
delineating their quasi-statal role, but does not extend the story to modern banking law and
administration. See supra note 113.
127. Ricks describes banking as a public-private partnership but does not address supervision.
RICKS, supra note 104, at 162–63, 204–05.
128. The only scholarship I am aware of that attempts this is nearly a century old. See ALLAN
G. GRUCHY, SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OF VIRGINIA STATE BANKS (1937) (examining state bank
oversight and its methods); THOMAS KANE, THE ROMANCE AND TRAGEDY OF BANKING (1921)
(recounting the history of the OCC). Classic banking treatises consider supervision but do not
theorize it. See, e.g., JOHN T. HOLDSWORTH, MONEY AND BANKING 318–35 (6th ed. 1937) (describing
supervision); KNIFFIN, supra note 55, at 349–70 (same).
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strengthened this mode of governance, aware of its unusual features
and unphased by reform efforts designed to formalize other parts of the
administrative state.
A. State Origins
The AMS emerged in response to the political and institutional
failure of the first American monetary order. This order, which lasted
from the Founding to 1836, used parastatal banking corporations to
expand the money supply and fuel economic growth. It was based off of
a monetary settlement struck in England in the 1690s. That settlement
had three main features: (1) delegation—Parliament chartered the
Bank of England to issue notes and deposits for use as money,129
pledging not to expand the money supply directly by devaluing the
metal content of its coins;130 (2) separation—Parliament prohibited the
Bank from engaging in commercial activities;131 and (3) monopoly—
Parliament agreed not to charter any other banks and forbade any other
company or partnership exceeding six persons from issuing bills, notes,
or any other debt instruments maturing in six months or less.132
Drawing on these antecedents, Congress chartered the Bank of
the United States (“BUS”) in 1791 and renewed its charter in 1816. The
Founding generation largely agreed that creating a bank to expand the
money supply would strengthen the new government and avoid
overissue.133 But like the members of Parliament who built the Bank of
129. The idea of using a bank to create an elastic money supply dates to the seventeenth
century. See WILLIAM PETTY, QUANTULUMCUNQUE CONCERNING MONEY (1682), reprinted in THE
ECONOMIC WRITINGS OF SIR WILLIAM PETTY 446 (Charles Henry Hull ed., 1899) (“What remedy is
there if we have too little Money? Answ. We must erect a Bank, which well computed, doth almost
double the Effect of our coined Money.”). Petty, of course, refers to “a Bank,” not “banks.”
130. For centuries, devaluations served as the primary means of monetary policy. They were
not always popular with financial and mercantile elites. DESAN, supra note 113, at 120–21, 169.
131. Bank of England Act (1694) § 26:
[T]o the Intent that their Majesties Subjects may not be oppressed by the said
Corporation by their monopolizing or ingrossing any sort of Goods, Wares, or
Merchandizes, . . . the said Corporation . . . shall not at any time . . . Deal or
Trade . . . in the buying or selling of any Goods, Wares or Merchandizes whatsoever.
132. A. ANDRÉADÈS, A HISTORY OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND 123 (1909). See also CHARLES W.
CALOMIRIS & STEPHEN H. HABER, FRAGILE BY DESIGN: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF BANKING CRISES
& SCARCE CREDIT 90–91 (2014). Calomiris and Haber describe this arrangement as the outcome
of “the Game of Bank Bargains,” id. at 85, “a political process . . . whose stakes are wealth and
power,” id. at 13, in which a country’s political bodies and financial elites haggle over “[f]inancial
[p]roperty [r]ights,” id. at 38. Calomiris and Haber adopt the licensing view of banking that this
Article rejects.
133. See Alexander Hamilton, The Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, (Alexander
Hamilton), on the Subject of a National Bank, in 7 CHARLES BROCKDEN BROWN & ROBERT WALSH,
AMERICAN REGISTER, OR GENERAL REPOSITORY OF HISTORY, POLITICS, AND SCIENCE 225, 238
(1810) [hereinafter Hamilton Report]:
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England,134 early U.S. officials viewed money creation as a prerogative
of government.135 Chartering the BUS thus meant in some sense
delegating state power to private actors and required some public
control.136 In practice, public control derived from the government’s
status as the Bank’s biggest customer and largest shareholder.137 The
Bank’s charter was time limited. And the Treasury secretary had
formal inspection rights.138 The Congress also had (and at one point
exercised) the power to convene a special committee to investigate the
Bank’s affairs. In 1816, when Congress rechartered the BUS, it gave
the president the power to appoint, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate, five of the Bank’s twenty-five directors.139
The stamping of paper is an operation so much easier than the laying of taxes, that a
government, in the practice of paper emissions, would rarely fail in any such emergency,
to indulge itself too far in the employment of that resource, to avoid as much as possible,
one less auspicious to present popularity;
HURST, supra note 107, at 154 (discussing “Hamilton’s emphasis on trusting the creation of
currency to private management, because it would be insulated . . . from the pressures that beat
upon public officials”).
134. During the colonial period, Massachusetts tried to open a mint, but Parliament viewed
American coins as a usurpation of Parliament’s sovereign power and forbade them. See GLYN
DAVIES, A HISTORY OF MONEY 461 (2002); RONNIE J. PHILLIPS, THE CHICAGO PLAN & NEW DEAL
BANKING REFORM 9 (1995). As a result, the colonists experimented extensively with paper moneys.
But Parliament did not like this either and so it restricted the ability of the colonies to issue paper
currency. PHILLIPS, supra, at 10.
135. For example, Albert Gallatin, secretary of the Treasury from 1801 to 1814, explained that
“[t]he right of issuing paper money as currency, like that of gold and silver coins, belongs
exclusively to the nation.” STEPHEN W. NICKERSON, LAW OF MONEY 40 (1900). William Crawford,
secretary of the Treasury from 1816 to 1825 and a skeptic of private banking, argued that
“[c]oinage and the regulation of money have[,] in all nations[,] been considered the highest acts of
sovereignty,” and therefore money “should not issue upon the credit of any individual or
association of individuals.” Id. Daniel Webster argued that the statal nature of banking was settled
at the founding and that it would be a mistake to allow the states to “delegate” the power to create
money to dozens of banks. DANIEL WEBSTER, MR. WEBSTER’S SPEECHES IN THE SENATE, UPON THE
QUESTION OF RENEWING THE CHARTER OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 5 (1832) (lamenting
that, although “[i]t cannot well be questioned, that it was intended by the Constitution to submit
the whole subject of the currency of the country . . . to the control . . . of Congress,” including the
“exclusive power” to “decide how far any substitute should interfere with it, and what that
substitute should be,” the states have “taken possession of the power” and “delegated” it to dozens
of state banks).
136. As Hamilton put it, an incorporated “bank is not a mere matter of private property, but a
political machine of the greatest importance to the state.” Hamilton Report, supra note 133, at 92.
See also id. at 240 (“Public utility is more truly the object of public banks, than private profit.”);
Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 505, 508 (1815):
The National Bank ought not to be regarded simply as a commercial bank . . . it is not
an institution created for the purposes of commerce and profit alone, but much more for
the purposes of national policy, as an auxiliary in the exercise of some of the highest
powers of the Government.
137. HAMMOND, supra note 104, at 144–45, 167; HOWARD BODENHORN, STATE BANKING IN
EARLY AMERICA 84 (2003).
138. Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, § 7, 1 Stat. 191, 193–195.
139. WHITE, supra note 49, at 460–75.
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States established analogues like the Bank of New York and the
Massachusetts Bank.140 These banks were also parastatal monopolies,
part-owned by the government,141 and their ability to expand the money
supply was regulated (and limited) by the BUS, which could redeem
their notes for specie to check overissue.142
This regime, championed by the country’s first Treasury
secretary, Alexander Hamilton, was politically unstable from the start
and ultimately collapsed. The first and most significant problem was
that the shareholders and managers of the BUS (and its couple dozen
state cousins) mostly came from the Federalist Party and formed what
appeared to be a new aristocracy. As one critic complained, in
chartering a single national bank, Congress “lodged” extraordinary
power “in the hands of less than fifty individuals, who [could] make the
whole monied capital of the United States bow to them.” 143 That these
individuals belonged to a minority party during a period of DemocraticRepublican ascendancy only deepened their opponents’ resentments.
The regime’s second problem was that the DemocraticRepublicans channeled their frustration into chartering dozens of new
banks at the state level to compete with the BUS, the Bank of New
York, and their kin144—something Hamilton never envisioned and

140. HAMMOND, supra note 104, at 164–66. Outside of London, Parliament similarly allowed
“country banks” to issue notes.
141. South Carolina and Vermont established wholly government-owned banks: the Bank of
the State of South Carolina and the Vermont State Bank. HAMMOND, supra note 104, at 166–68.
Delaware set up the Farmers Bank of the State of Delaware, for which it was the primary
stockholder. Id. at 167.
142. ROSS M. ROBERTSON, THE COMPTROLLER AND BANK SUPERVISION 19 (2d ed. 1995).
143. Hezekiah Niles, To Correct Abuses by the Bank, NILES’ WKLY. REG., Mar. 7, 1818, at 17,
23. See also Joseph Sommer, The Birth of the American Business Corporation, 49 BUFF. L. REV.
1011, 1054 (2001) (explaining that the problem with these banks was their “intermediate
statal nexus”).
144. After the Democratic-Republicans swept to power in 1800, they set up the “State Bank,
Albany,” arguing that the Bank of Albany, chartered in 1792, was a Federalist outfit and that
Albany “needed a Republican bank.” HAMMOND, supra note 104, at 158. Similarly, Pennsylvania
chartered the Farmers and Mechanics Bank, requiring that “a majority of the bank’s directors be
‘farmers, mechanics, and manufacturers actually employed in their respective professions,’ ” i.e.,
that they be Republicans. Id. at 165. Rhode Island too set up a bank to serve “the agricultural and
mechanical interest”—the Washington Bank in Westerly. And the State Bank of Boston,
established in 1811 in Massachusetts, advertised itself as “cherishing Republican men and
Republican measures against the wiles and machinations” of the Federalists. Id. at 147. Jefferson
himself, once president—realizing that he could not eliminate Hamilton’s banks without sinking
the American economy—wrote to his Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin, “I am decidedly in favor
of making all the banks Republican by sharing deposits among them in proportion to the
dispositions they show.” Id. at 146–47. Banking was “an integral part of the spoils of politics.
Federalists would grant no charters to Republicans, or Republicans to Federalists.” HORACE
WHITE, MONEY AND BANKING: ILLUSTRATED BY AMERICAN HISTORY 333–34 (1895). Thus, the
number of banks in the country grew from twenty-nine in 1800 to ninety in 1811. HAMMOND, supra
note 104, at 144–45.

984

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:4:951

strongly opposed.145 When the BUS tried to tame the growing mass of
banks in the 1820s, the system was strained past its breaking point.
State bankers retaliated by helping to elect Andrew Jackson, who, over
the course of his two terms, drove the BUS out of business and
its executives out of power. A monetary collapse and economic
depression followed.
These events set the stage for the emergence of the AMS. This
Section examines the first step in that process—the creation of the New
York model. The New York model prefigured the law forged thirty years
later at the federal level, repurposing elements of the British system
while diffusing and democratizing the power of banks. Instead of
relying on a monopoly or an oligopoly—far more monetarily stable
arrangements—New York allowed every community to have its own
banks, with charters available to the general public on a nonpartisan
basis, thus putting in place one critical element of the AMS: open access.
And since New York’s legislators could no longer handpick their
franchisees, they also began to develop another element: supervision.
They allowed the government to influence bank note issuance, examine
books and records, and revoke charters at any sign of trouble. And they
decided to delegate this responsibility to independent technocrats.
Supervision and open access were thus coeval.
1. New York’s Safety Fund Act
New York invented bank supervision between 1829 and 1851.146
The initial blueprint was the product of a compromise between
145. When the rumors reached Hamilton of efforts to open a second bank in New York in 1791,
he wrote to an executive at the Bank of New York:
I have learnt with infinite pain the circumstance of a new bank having started up in
your city. Its effects cannot but be in every way pernicious. These extravagant sallies of
speculation do injury to the government, and to the whole system of public
credit, . . . three great banks in one city must raise such a mass of artificial credit as
must endanger every one of them, and do harm in every view. I sincerely hope . . . the
joint force of two solid institutions [the First Bank and the Bank of New York] will,
without effort or violence remove, the excrescence which has just appeared and which I
consider as a dangerous tumor in your political and commercial economy.
HENRY DOMETT, A HISTORY OF THE BANK OF NEW YORK 42 (1884).
146. Leonard White attributes the “discovery” that something like supervisory power is
necessary to “control[ ] the corporate affairs of banks” to Massachusetts in 1838, WHITE, supra
note 29, at 475, but Massachusetts largely copied New York’s scheme, see infra note 183 (citing
the example of New York). Other sources trace supervision back to Massachusetts in 1813. See
Mitchener & Jaremski, supra note 55, at 823 (citing GRUCHY, supra note 128, at 15) (“In 1813, the
governor set up a system of three bank commissioners to enforce charter regulations . . . .”). But
these sources mischaracterize Massachusetts law. In 1811, the Massachusetts legislature began
to require that new banks over a certain size pay to have three “commissioners” specially appointed
to certify their specie reserves before opening. See An Act of June 27, 1811, ch. 84, § 2, 1811 Mass.
Acts 501, 501 (the State Bank); see also An Act of June 23, 1812, ch. 34, § 2, 1812 Mass. Acts 47,
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legislators skeptical of paper currency and those loyal to banks eager to
retain their charters. The skeptics had the upper hand. The charters of
most of the banks in New York were due to expire, and there was
limited political will to renew them absent a way to ensure the
reliability of their issues. The bankers strongly objected to the medicine
suggested by some: unlimited stockholder liability.147 In 1829, Martin
Van Buren, an ally of President Jackson and the governor of New York,
embraced a creative alternative. Instead of making bank stockholders
responsible for their own bank’s monetary issues, Van Buren proposed
to make banks responsible for each other.148
Van Buren’s proposal had two parts. First, all new banks would
be required to contribute three percent of their capital to a “Safety
Fund” to be maintained by the state and used to pay off the notes and
deposits of banks that failed. Second, all new banks would be regularly
inspected by three “bank commissioners”—one to be selected by the
governor, a second by the banks in the southern part of the state, and a
third by the banks in the remaining, mostly rural, parts of the state.149
(In 1837, New York changed the law to make all three commissioners
government appointees.150) Each bank commissioner would serve for
47–48 (the Boston Bank); An Act of June 23, 1812, ch. 38, § 2, 1812 Mass. Acts 62, 62–63 (the
Union Bank); An Act of June 16, 1813, ch. 46, § 2, 1813 Mass. Acts 270, 271–272 (the New England
Bank); An Act of Feb. 18, 1814, ch. 134, § 2, 1814 Mass. Acts 383, 383–384 (the Manufacturers and
Mechanics Bank); An Act of Feb. 10, 1818, ch. 92, § 2, 1818 Mass. Acts 489, 489–490 (the Suffolk
Bank); An Act of Feb. 3, 1829, ch. 96, § 3, 1829 Mass. Acts 1, 3 (codifying the requirements for all
new banks). These one-off commissioners had no other powers or functions. Id. I suspect the
contrary view stems from a misreading of WHITE, supra note 144, at 317, which Gruchy cites and
which refers to provisions in the Act to Incorporate the New England Bank, authorizing these
special commissioners. Id.; GRUCHY, supra note 128, at 15, 15 n.3.
147. See JOHN JAY KNOX, A HISTORY OF BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES 399 (1900).
148. Martin Van Buren, The Autobiography of Martin Van Buren, in 2 ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE YEAR 1918, at 7, 221 (1920).
149. The New York Safety Fund Act, April 2, 1829, reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
BANKING AND CURRENCY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 88, at 643, 645–46 (section fifteen of
the Safety Fund Act). Van Buren’s plan mimicked the administrative structure New York had
designed to govern another infrastructure industry—turnpikes. Between 1797 and 1807, New
York established county highway commissions to supervise “turnpike corporations” and their toll
roads. RONALD E. SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION, 1784-1855, at
39–42 (1982). The commissioners were independent technocrats, and the fight over their ample
discretionary power prefigures the administrative law critique of the banking agencies today. In
1806, New York authorized the commissioners to issue written orders to turnpike companies in
certain circumstances. The turnpike corporations (and Chancellor James Kent) objected. Id. at 40–
41. According to Kent, then a member of New York’s Council of Revisions, the measure would vest
“an arbitrary power over the interest and property of individuals which is unknown to the
Constitution.” Id. But the legislature passed the law over Kent’s objection. The state regarded
turnpike corporations as franchisees, wielding the statal power of eminent domain, and Governor
George Clinton argued “a summary mode ought . . . to be prescribed to exact a compliance from
those companies with the intentions of government.” Id. at 40.
150. Act of Mar. 15, 1837, ch. 74, § 2, 1837 N.Y. Laws 56, 56. In 1840, New York added a fourth
commissioner. See Act of May 14, 1840, ch. 363, § 13, 1840 N.Y Laws 306, 308, reprinted in THE
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two years unless sooner removed by the governor for misconduct or
neglect of duty,151 and each would be a “check upon the others.”152
These commissioners were the prototype for modern bank
supervision. They were term-tenured officers of the state sworn to
uphold its constitution. They were prohibited from having a personal
interest in any bank.153 They were to visit each bank every four months
and could “examine upon oath, all the officers, servants, [and] agents of
[each bank], or any other person, in relation to the affairs and condition
of [the bank].”154 Along with subpoena power, they had remedial
authority. If the commissioners “ascertain[ed] from [their] inspection
and examination, or in any other manner, that any of [the] said
corporations [were] insolvent, or [had] violated any of the provisions of
their act or acts of incorporation, or of any other act binding on such
corporations,” they could “immediately apply to the court of
chancery . . . for an injunction.”155
Van Buren defended the new law in monetary terms, in effect,
as an outsourcing arrangement. The “chief duty” of the state, he told
the legislature, “is to see that the farmer, when he exchanges his
produce or estate—the mechanic his wares—the merchant his goods—
and all other classes of the community their property or services for

BANKING SYSTEM OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 113, 123 (John Cleveland & G.S. Hutchinson eds.,
2d ed. 1980).
151. The New York Safety Fund Act, April 2, 1829, reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
BANKING AND CURRENCY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 88, at 1188 (section twenty-three of
the Safety Fund Act). Section 23 is one of the first for-cause removal statutes in U.S. history. See
Jane Manners & Lev Menand, The Three Permissions: Presidential Removal and the Statutory
Limits of Agency Independence, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 43–45 (2021).
152. KNOX, supra note 147, at 404.
153. See id. at 405. While the Safety Fund bill created the first bank supervisors, state
oversight of money-issuing franchises dates to at least the eighth century. See DESAN, supra note
113, at 56 (explaining that eighth century Anglo-Saxon kings “supervised moneyers within their
kingdom”). In the mid-twelfth century, Henry II adopted a system called “free minting,” in part
because it allowed for fewer, more highly supervised mints. As Desan explains,
Although moneyers originally performed their own tests [on coins], the process was
gradually improved and standardized . . . . [E]ach sheriff, anticipating that he might
personally lose if the coin he brought in failed to meet the sterling standard would take
“good care . . . that the moneyers placed under him [did] not exceed the limits of the
appointed standard” or stretch the bullion further by adding more alloy.
Id. at 75; see also MARTIN ALLEN, MINTS AND MONEY IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 164–69 (2012)
(discussing the state’s efforts to ensure that privately operated mints complied with government
standards); Mavis Mate, Monetary Policy in England, 1272-1307, 41 BRIT. NUMISMATIC J. 34, 37
(1972) (same); THOMAS J. SARGENT & FRANCOIS R. VELDE, THE BIG PROBLEM OF SMALL CHANGE
48 (2002) (explaining that medieval “mints were contracted out to private entrepreneurs”).
154. The New York Safety Fund Act, April 2, 1829, reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
BANKING AND CURRENCY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 88, at 643, 646 (section seventeen of
the Safety Fund Act).
155. Id. at 646 (section 18 of the Safety Fund Act).
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bank paper, may rest contented as to its value.”156 According to Van
Buren, the law’s “system of supervision,” “if fairly carried into effect,”
would do this: it would “preserve the fund, and . . . give our paper
currency the utmost credit and stability.”157 Despite an aggressive
campaign by Wall Street bankers to block the proposal,158 the bill
became law on April 2, 1829.159
2. New York’s Free Banking Act
A decade later, New York took another major step toward the
modern practice of supervision when it expanded access to bank
charters by passing a general incorporation statute. The shift was the
result of Jackson’s successful war on the BUS, whose charter expired in
1836.160 When the monetary system collapsed the following year, state
banks suspended cash payments (i.e., they stopped redeeming their
notes or allowing withdrawals in gold and silver coins), and the country
plunged into a deep depression. 161
Although Jacksonian ideology had caused the collapse, most
people did not see it that way. Aspiring bankers had an easy time
convincing Americans, who were always in need of currency, that there
were too few banks and that the existing banks exercised oppressive
power.162 A breakaway sect of the Democratic Party called the LocoFocos argued that the severe credit scarcity was due to undemocratic
and subversive bank “monopolies,” most of which were Safety Fund
banks. The Loco-Focos demanded that the legislature stop granting
special privileges to handpicked citizens and instead recognize the
156. Annual Message by New York Governor Martin Van Buren Recommending Bank Reform
and the Safety Fund, January 23, 1829, reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF BANKING AND
CURRENCY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 88, at 636, 639.
157. Id. at 641–42.
158. Wall Street banks opposed the new law and “tried to force the hands of the state
government by pretending to wind up their affairs.” FRITZ REDLICH, THE MOLDING OF AMERICAN
BANKING: MEN AND IDEAS 266 (2d ed. 1968). But the BUS stepped into the breach and expanded
lending to New York merchants and country banks, foiling these efforts. Id.
159. Amendatory Act of April 2, 1829, ch. 94, § 1, 1829 N.Y. Laws 167, 167, reprinted in THE
BANKING SYSTEM OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, supra note 150, at 29, 29–38.
160. Jackson’s war was due in part to lobbying from Wall Street banks eager to eliminate
federal regulation of money issuance and to break Philadelphia’s grip on American finance.
Philadelphia served as the headquarters for the BUS. And Wall Street banks had not forgotten
Biddle’s 1829 intervention, which thwarted their efforts to block the Safety Fund Act. See supra
note 158. Moreover, these banks could not benefit from the seven percent rate of interest permitted
by that Act because the BUS’s New York City branch offered discounts at six percent interest. See
JOHN THOM HOLDSWORTH & DAVIS R. DEWEY, THE SECOND UNITED STATES BANK 265, 269 (1910).
161. J.G. Forbes, C. Starr & T. Cary, Annual Report of the Banking Commissioners, in 3
DOCUMENTS OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK No. 64, at 8 (1841).
162. See, e.g., HURST, supra note 107, at 88, 167–68; KNOX, supra note 147, at 397 (discussing
corrupt chartering in New York).
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“natural” “rights of the people to compete with the incorporated banks
in dealing in money and credit.”163
Many Democratic officials agreed with the Loco-Focos and
thought that the answer to the contraction was more banks. State
senator Samuel Young, for example, complained that the Safety Fund
system had spawned “unmitigated inequity in the distribution of [bank]
stock” and “demoraliz[ed] the public through the process of getting
charters.”164 Young wanted “free banking”—free, meaning open
access165—with no limit on the number or duration of bank charters and
no involvement of the legislature in deciding whether to authorize a
bank to open for business.166
In 1838, Governor William Marcy, seeking to avoid a schism
within his party, pushed free banking into law, beginning a radical
experiment in money creation.167 New York’s new system—often
mistaken today for a deregulatory scheme—was anything but. Instead,
it represented the unique compromise at the heart of the AMS. It
opened the business of banking to “full and free competition, under such
general restrictions and regulations as are necessary to [e]nsure to the
163. REDLICH, supra note 158, at 189.
164. Id. at 197. Even the bank commissioners agreed. See KNOX, supra note 147, at 405
(quoting the commissioners report, which stated that “[t]he distribution of bank stocks created at
the last session” has prompted “violent contention and bitter personal animosities, corrupting to
the public mind and destructive of the peace and harmony of society”).
165. See, e.g., ROBERTSON, supra note 142, at 23 (“To the people of the time the adjective ‘free’
meant that any individual or group of individuals, upon compliance with certain procedural steps
in the statute, could start a bank.”). “Free banking” is often misinterpreted today to mean “subject
to minimum regulations.” See, e.g., White, supra note 71, at 19.
166. New York first used free incorporation to address concerns about the legislature’s role in
dispensing privileges in 1784 when it began to administratively charter religious institutions. See
SEAVOY, supra note 149, at 9–10. (Pennsylvania did this first in 1791. Id. at 32 n.2.) One of the
earliest advocates of free banking was the Columbia professor of political economy John McVickar,
who proposed it in 1827. See JOHN MCVICKAR, HINTS ON BANKING: I N A LETTER TO A GENTLEMAN
IN ALBANY; BY A NEW YORKER (1827) (critiquing bank incorporation by the legislature as corrupt,
self-dealing, and ineffective).
167. HAMMOND, supra note 104, at 583. See REDLICH, supra note 158, at 196 (explaining that
“but for the crisis of 1837 and the collapse of American banking which followed in its wake,” free
banking would never have happened). Although, during the early 1830s, Jackson expressed
interest in replacing the BUS with a Treasury-run institution, there was not much support for this
idea in either party. HAMMOND, supra note 104, at 360–61 (explaining that Jackson, for a time,
envisioned a national bank with a branch in each state subject to the supervision of the Treasury
and quoting Jackson as preferring an “entirely national” bank); see also Message by President
Andrew Jackson Vetoing the Bank Recharter, July 10, 1832, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF BANKING AND CURRENCY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 88, at 816, 827 (arguing
that Congress has exercised its power to coin money by establishing mints and “if they have other
power to regulate the currency [i.e. through issuing bank money], it was conferred to be exercised
by themselves, and not to be transferred to a corporation”); id. at 817 (“Every monopoly and all
exclusive privileges are granted at the expense of the public . . . .”). Those who had championed
the BUS were suspicious of a wholly government-owned bank, which they feared the government
would use to avoid levying taxes. See, e.g., supra note 133 and accompanying text; see also Briscoe
v. President & Dirs. of Bank of Ky., 36 U.S. 257, 329–50 (1837) (Story, J., dissenting).
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public a large and sound currency.”168 At the same time as New York
opened access, it also imposed separation and supervision.
Indeed, “free banking” as pioneered by New York, and copied by
many other states,169 was a regulatory measure. New York’s law
required that all banks back their notes with government bonds and
that they deposit these bonds with the state comptroller.170 In the event
that a bank failed to redeem its notes, the law authorized the state
comptroller to sell the bonds, pay the noteholders, and close the bank.171
The law prohibited banks from commencing business without paid-in
capital of $100,000 (a substantial sum),172 and all banks were required
to keep a specie reserve of 12.5 percent of the value of their outstanding
notes.173 Any bank creditor or shareholder with at least $1,000 on the
line could appeal to the chancellor to conduct “a strict examination . . .
of all the affairs” of the bank “for the purpose of ascertaining the safety
of its investments, and the prudence of its management.”174 And all
banks were required to publish financial statements. 175
Soon after the law took effect, the need for stronger, full-time
discretionary oversight became evident.176 In 1840, New York amended
the law to require anyone “carrying on banking business,” including the
168. REDLICH, supra note 158, at 190 (quoting Marcy). As Hurst explains, “the implicit policy
which emerged was one favoring delegation of money functions to private management, out of
belief that liberal delegation would best muster the energy and resources to spur the economy.”
HURST, supra note 107, at 154. Gulian Verplanck, a state senator sitting on the Court of Errors,
the highest court in New York at the time, put it this way:
Strong public opinion and the requirements of trade were thought, by a large majority
of the [l]egislature . . . to demand some legislation whereby the business of banking
could be thrown open, under proper restraints, to all who might choose to engage in it,
and this without dependence upon political patronage.
Warner & Ray v. Beers, 23 Wend. 103, 139 (N.Y. 1840).
169. Drawing from New York’s draft legislative text, Michigan passed a similar law in 1837.
See HAMMOND, supra note 104, at 572, 582. As the Supreme Court of Michigan explained in 1844,
a general incorporation act for banks was “unknown in the history of legislation, either in this
state or any other state or country.” Green v. Graves, 1 Doug. 351, 355 (Mich. 1844).
170. The New York Free Banking Acts of April 18, 1838 and May 14, 1840, reprinted in 2
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF BANKING AND CURRENCY IN THE UNITED, supra note 88, at 1183, 1183–
91. Under certain conditions, some mortgages on New York land might also be pledged. Id. at 1185
(sections seven and eight of the Act of April 18, 1838).
171. Id. at 1184, 1187, 1190 (sections 4, 12, and 27 the Act of April 18, 1838).
172. Id. at 1186 (section 15 of the Act of April 18, 1838).
173. Id. at 1191 (section 33 of the Act of April 18, 1838).
174. Id. at 1188–89 (section 25 of the Act of April 18, 1838). The chancellor, however, could not
take any direct action and could only publish a report along with his opinion. Id.
175. Id. at 1189 (section 26 of the Act of April 18, 1838).
176. 1 WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, A HISTORY OF BANKING IN ALL THE LEADING NATIONS;
COMPRISING THE UNITED STATES; GREAT BRITAIN; GERMANY; AUSTRO-HUNGARY; FRANCE; ITALY;
BELGIUM; SPAIN; SWITZERLAND; PORTUGAL; ROUMANIA; RUSSIA; H OLLAND; THE SCANDINAVIAN
NATIONS; CANADA; CHINA; JAPAN 313 (1896). For example, new banks were abusing their franchise
by avoiding redeeming their notes in specie on demand.
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“free” banks, to be “subject to the inspection and supervision of the bank
commissioners.”177 In 1843, due in part to concerns about the
impartiality of the commissioners,178 New York transferred
responsibility for bank oversight to the state comptroller,179 elected
every three years by the legislature.180 New York also stripped banks of
their power to print their own notes, shifting that responsibility to the
comptroller, who would register and issue notes only on receipt of the
required securities.181
Those involved in developing the New York model, as well as
those legislators in other states who copied and refined it, understood
the originality of their project and the key role discretionary
administrative oversight played in rendering a more diffuse banking
system sustainable.182 For example, in 1837, one Massachusetts state
senator noted that the bank commissions recently established in New
York, Vermont, and Maine exercised a salutary informal power over
banks—precisely the sort of power under attack today. As he put it,

177. Act of May 14, 1840, ch. 363, § 11, 1840 N.Y. Laws 306, reprinted in THE BANKING S YSTEM
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, supra note 150, at 113, 122 (emphasis added). New York’s legislature,

at this early date, is already distinguishing between the power of examination and the activity of
supervision—the informal control exercised by examiners over a bank’s affairs.
178. KNOX, supra note 147, at 403 (quoting one New York legislator explaining that the
commissioners “were placed there like cur dogs to watch a meat market, and were as easily
subsidized by suitable food”).
179. Act of Apr. 18, 1843, ch. 218, § 6, 1843 N.Y. Laws 299, reprinted in THE BANKING S YSTEM
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, supra note 150, at 136, 140–41.
180. This appears to have been done in part to assuage the banks who disliked the
commissioners and their broad investigatory powers and in part because, as Millard Fillmore
explained, the reforms of 1837 had “brought [the commissioners] within the vortex of the great
political whirlpool of the State; and the place was sought for and conferred upon [partisan]
aspirants, without due regard in all cases to their qualifications to discharge the delicate trust
committed to them.” See State of N.Y. Comptroller’s Off., Annual Report of the Comptroller (Jan.
4, 1849), in 1 DOCUMENTS OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK no. 5, at 51 (1849). In
1846, New York adopted a new constitution, which subjected the comptroller’s office to popular
election biannually. N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. V, § 1.
181. See KNOX, supra note 147, at 419.
182. As A.C. Flagg, New York’s comptroller from 1833 to 1839 and 1842 to 1847, explained:
After repudiating the British form of government, we adopted her paper system, in a
form much more loose and insecure to the people, than was ever tolerated even in
England. . . . The acknowledgement of the necessity of [strict] restrictions in
England, . . . in creating debt and paper money, ought to admonish us of the necessity
of new safe-guards; . . . it is of the highest importance that . . . New York, should give
the full force of its example, to the establishment of a sound currency, . . . and the sacred
preservation of the public faith.
State of N.Y. Comptroller’s Off., Annual Report of the Comptroller’s Office (Jan. 12, 1846), in
DOCUMENTS OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK no. 25, at 72–74 (1846). New York’s
supervisors understood that deposits were also part of the currency. See Report of the Bank
Commissioners (Jan. 31, 1831), in DOCUMENTS OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK no.
59, at 9 (1831) (“[C]urrency . . . may be said to consist of specie, bank notes, and deposits in banks
transferable by means of checks.”).
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banks are incentivized “to meet the approbation of the government’s
officers,” and accordingly, commissioners “exert a controlling influence
over the banks’ issues, discounts, exchanges, deposit[ ]s, in short, over
all their operations.”183 As a result, commissioners “contribute,
essentially, to the stability and usefulness of these institutions, by
producing a uniformity in their operations, and by sustaining, towards
them, the confidence of the public.”184
To bolster this “controlling influence” and prevent bank
failures,185 the states continued to expand discretionary authority in the
decade that followed.186 Most notably, in 1847, New York’s legislature
introduced the concepts of safety and soundness into law,187 mimicking
similar statutes already enacted in Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
and Connecticut.188 Massachusetts law, for example, required state
183. Debate in the Massachusetts Legislature: Remarks of Mr. Lawrence, of Hampshire, on
the Bill for the Appointment of Bank Commissioners, BOS. DAILY ADVERTISER, Feb. 23, 1837.
184. Id. Senator Lawrence continued: “[C]ommissioners, armed with authority to enter any
bank, on any day, and any hour of the day, and with ample powers, to ferret out mischiefs, if any
exist . . . would exert a most salutary restraint on their managers . . . . It would abolish all
discordant customs among the banks, and introduce a uniform system of usages and modes.” Id.
185. For example, by 1847, of the 117 free banks incorporated in New York, forty-three had
already been closed, thirty of these by the comptroller. State of N.Y. Comptroller’s Off., Annual
Report of the Comptroller (Jan. 6, 1847), in 1 DOCUMENTS OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK no. 5, at 54 (1847).
186. New York’s supervisors sought enhanced authority as early as 1842. Annual Report of the
Bank Commissioners, in 2 DOCUMENTS OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK no. 29, at
22 (1842). The commissioners also complained about window dressing and proposed the first “call
reports.” Id. at 20.
187. Act of Dec. 4, 1847, ch. 419, § 3, 1847 N.Y. Laws 519, reprinted in THE BANKING S YSTEM
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, supra note 159, at 146, 149–50 (1864) (emphasis added):
Whenever in the opinion of the comptroller, there [is] good cause to suspect that any
bank . . . has made an incorrect or imperfect quarterly return, or is in an unsound or
unsafe condition to do banking business, it shall be his duty to have . . . such
bank . . . examined [and] . . . report . . . the result of such examination.
The 1847 statute, in its choice of words, resembles the text of an 1846 Ohio law expanding the
oversight powers of the Board of Control of Ohio’s bank branching system. See Act of Jan. 6, 1846,
§ 2, in 2 THE VERIFIED REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF OHIO: INCLUDING ALL LAWS OF A
GENERAL NATURE IN FORCE JAN. 1ST, 1890, at 2299. The existing literature tracks safety and
soundness law to 1933. See, e.g., Schooner, supra note 74, at 188 (“Principles of safety and
soundness have been a source of directors’ duties since as early as 1933 when Congress authorized
removal proceedings against national bank directors for unsafe or unsound banking practices.”);
DALVINDER SINGH, BANKING REGULATION OF UK AND US FINANCIAL MARKETS 70 (2007) (“Safety
and soundness . . . was first incorporated in US bank regulation with the enactment of the
Banking Act 1933 . . . .”); Thomas L. Holzman, Unsafe or Unsound Practices: Is the Current
Judicial Interpretation of the Term Unsafe or Unsound?, 19 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 425, 428 (2000)
(noting that its “origin presents somewhat of a mystery as does the lack of debate surrounding its
adoption” in 1933). I examine the evolution of this standard in separate work focused on
resurrecting the history of state banking law. See Lev Menand, The Monetary Basis of Bank
Supervision (unpublished manuscript).
188. Each state used slightly different language. Compare An Act Concerning Banks, § 14, in
PUBLIC STATUTE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 94 (1839) (“Whenever in the opinion of the
bank commissioners the charter of any bank shall be forfeited [i.e. the bank shall have violated
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judges to issue injunctions before holding “a hearing of evidence to
satisfy [their] own mind” merely “on the complaint of the bank
commissioners” that a bank’s “condition is such as to render its further
progress hazardous to the public.”189 New York subsequently gave its
officials a similar power to proceed against banks when, in their
opinion, banks were in an “unsound or unsafe condition.”190 Today this
distinctive language serves as the lynchpin of the federal government’s
statutory authority over banks.
Officials once again explained the need for strict oversight in
outsourcing terms:
When the State assumes to authori[z]e a person, or associations of persons, to stamp
paper dollars, and literally force them into the hands of the citizen, in exchange for his
labor and his property, it is an incumbent duty to compel the manufacturer of the currency
to secure such citizen[ ] against loss . . . .191

According A.C. Flagg, New York’s comptroller, “the holder [of New York
bank paper] ought to feel as safe, so far as the action of the government
is concerned, as he does with coin stamped at the mint.”192 In 1849, the
future President Millard Fillmore, who succeeded Flagg as comptroller,
explained that “[t]o furnish this currency, so far as it consists of paper
or credit, is an exclusive privilege granted by the State, and the State
should take care that in granting it the people are secured from
imposition and loss.”193 For the founders of the AMS, then, money

the provisions of the Act], or the public are in danger of being defrauded thereby . . . .”), with Act
of July 4, 1837, ch. 140, § 27, in REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 266 (1843)
(“If such commissioners, upon an examination into the affairs of any bank or for other good cause,
shall deem it unsafe for the public interest . . . .”), and Act of Feb. 23, 1838, ch. 14, § 5, in
SUPPLEMENTS TO THE REVISED STATUTES: GENERAL LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
MASSACHUSETTS 60 (1849):
If upon examination of any bank . . . said commissioners shall be of [the] opinion that
the same is insolvent, or that its condition is such as to render its further progress
hazardous to the public, or to those having funds in its custody, and also that said
bank . . . has exceeded its powers, or has failed to comply with all of the rules,
restrictions and conditions provided by law . . . .
189. Commonwealth by Bank Comm’rs v. President of Farmers & Mechs. Bank, 38 Mass. 542,
549 (1839). In 1839, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in what it described as a “very
important case,” upheld the power, explaining that its “object was to prevent [banks] becoming
dangerous to the public by their mismanagement and breach of the laws,” and that it was a proper
exercise of legislative authority, especially “[w]hen it is considered how important it is to all the
great interests of the community, that banks should be managed uprightly and with
integrity . . . and how important it is that they should enjoy the confidence of the community.” Id.
at 549–51.
190. See infra note 197.
191. State of N.Y. Comptroller’s Off., supra note 182, at 72.
192. State of N.Y. Comptroller’s Off., Annual Report of the Comptroller (Jan. 5, 1848), in 1
DOCUMENTS OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK no. 4, at 64 (1848).
193. State of N.Y. Comptroller’s Off., supra note 180, at 54.
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creation was a sovereign prerogative, and it followed that delegating
this power to private actors required close public control.
In 1851, New York extended public control over banks even
further by transferring supervision to a full-time independent agency,
the New York Banking Department,194 a clear precursor to today’s
banking agencies and the first such body in the United States. 195 This
was supervision in a modern key, as the state fully embraced an ongoing
oversight role. New York charged the department with ensuring that
the state’s monetary system functioned properly and that credits issued
by the state’s banks maintained a stable value in gold and silver coins.
In 1854, it empowered the superintendent to “refuse to issue or deliver
any registered notes to” a bank in “an unsound or unsafe condition,”
“until such time as he shall be satisfied that such bank . . . is in a sound
and safe condition to do [ ] banking business.” 196 This provision allowed
the superintendent to suspend a bank’s business not just when the bank
violated a rule but whenever the superintendent thought the bank was
being mismanaged. In the subsequent decades, the department was
repeatedly strengthened,197 gaining the authority to institute
insolvency proceedings against banks and “take possession” of
“unsound” banks outright.198
194. Act of Apr. 12, 1851, ch. 164, § 3, 1851 N.Y. Laws 309, reprinted in THE BANKING S YSTEM
note 150, at 179, 180.
195. The Banking Department had a precursor in a powerful independent agency New York
created in 1784 to oversee its education system: the Regents of the University of the State of New
York. New York empowered the Regents to charter, examine, and supervise schools. See SEAVOY,
supra note 149, at 13–15; Revised Statutes of the State of N.Y., Part I, Chap. XV, Title 1, Art. 1
(1829) (providing the organizational structure and powers of the Board of Regents).
196. Act of Apr. 15, 1854, ch. 242, § 3, 1854 N.Y. Laws 551, reprinted in THE BANKING S YSTEM
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, supra note 150, at 200–02 (emphasis added). Section 3 also provided
that the superintendent could restrict note issue if he determined that the business of the bank
was “not transacted in the manner prescribed by law.” Id.
197. In 1882, New York authorized the bank superintendent, in conjunction with the state
attorney-general, to institute insolvency proceedings whenever a bank “has committed a violation
of its charter or of law” or “is conducting business in an unsafe or unauthorized manner.” Act of
July 1, 1882, ch. 409, § 223, reprinted in BANKING LAWS: AN ACT TO REVISE THE STATUTES OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK RELATING TO BANKS, BANKING AND TRUST COMPANIES 86 (2012). In 1892, New
York amended the law to provide that the superintendent may “take possession” of a bank if he
has “reason to conclude that [it] . . . is in an unsound or unsafe condition to do banking business.”
Act of May 18, 1892, ch. 689, § 17, reprinted in 2 THE REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK 1038 (1896) (emphasis added).
198. The term “sound” was an adjective commonly used to describe monetary instruments—
notes and deposits—that could be converted into base money (then gold and silver coins) on
demand at par. In forthcoming work, I argue that the first use of the term in this sense was
probably in the 1810 Report of the Bullion Committee, an assessment by the British Parliament
of whether the Bank of England’s 1797 suspension of cash payments (i.e., its refusal to redeem its
notes and deposits in gold and silver coin) had triggered inflation. HOUSE OF COMMONS, REPORT
FROM THE SELECT COMM. ON THE HIGH PRICE OF BULLION (1810), reprinted in THE PAPER POUND
OF 1797-1821, at 6 (Edwin Canaan ed., 2d ed. 1969). See also HC Deb (7 May 1811) (19) cols. 994–
95 (Lord Castlereagh) (“When I speak of our circulation in a sound state, I mean a circulation,
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, supra
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B. Federal Transformation
Three decades after the collapse of the BUS, the federal
government began to create the institutional framework that would
comprise the modern AMS. In doing so, it drew heavily on the New York
Model. First, in 1863, Congress created the OCC to charter and oversee
hundreds of national banks to serve collectively as a sort of “Third Bank
of the United States.” Then, in 1913, it created the Fed to coordinate
national banks and extend federal supervision to a growing mass of
banks chartered by state governments. Both agencies were designed to
manage our open-access monetary system by ensuring that the private
managers and shareholders of banks create sound money.
1. The National Bank Act
After the demise of the Second Bank in 1834, it took thirty years
and a war to build our modern monetary order. By 1862, there were
approximately 1,500 state banks, creating most of the money supply by
lending to business firms. These banks were primarily concentrated in
the seventeen states that had enacted free banking laws modeled on
New York’s.199 A handful of states employed a publicly controlled
“branching system,” with a government-run Board of Directors

composed of Bank-paper and coin, in such proportions as will enable any man to convert, at his
pleasure, his notes into coin.”). But the use of the word “sound” to describe money long predates
paper currency as it was common to speak of “sound” pennies (i.e., silver coins that were current
and not clipped or damaged). See, e.g., DESAN, supra note 113, at 125; A. BARTON HEPBURN, A
HISTORY OF CURRENCY IN THE UNITED STATES 31 (Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 1967)
(suggesting that the term “sound” originated from an “auricular” test whereby a coin was dropped
and its quality would be determined based on the sound of the resulting ring). In 1840, Maryland,
in its annual report to Congress on its banking system, proclaimed that “[t]he end of the design for
which the [state’s] banks were created was to secure a sound and redeemable paper currency—a
paper currency at all times payable on demand in specie.” H.R. Doc. No. 26-172, at 378 (1840). At
the end of the century, A. Barton Hepburn, a bank supervisor, gave this same definition: “Sound
money as applied to paper or token money of any kind means that which is redeemable in money
wherein the commercial value of its bullion equals its coinage value.” HEPBURN, supra, at 30–31.
So, when New York empowered supervisors to ensure that banks were “sound” they were referring
to, as A.C. Flagg put it, “efforts to make the paper issues of [banks] equivalent to gold and silver,
or as nearly so as practicable . . . .” State of N.Y. Comptroller’s Off., supra note 182, at 72.
199. See ROBERTSON, supra note 142, at 16. Rhode Island, an exception with eighty-eight
banks by 1863, adopted a robust supervisory scheme. See KNOX, supra note 147, at 373 (noting the
statutory and supervisory limits placed on banks); An Act in Relation to Banks, § 7, in PUBLIC
LAWS OF THE STATE OF RHODE-ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS AS REVISED BY A
COMMITTEE AND FINALLY ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT THE SESSION IN JANUARY, 1844,
at 290 (1852) (providing that the bank commissioner might enjoin any bank if “in his
opinion . . . [that] bank has forfeited its charter at law, or is so managing its concerns that the
public are in danger of being defrauded thereby”).
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supervising privately capitalized branches.200 The remaining states
prohibited banking entirely or still operated parastatal oligopolies on
the Hamiltonian model.201
For states like New York and Massachusetts, with appropriate
restrictions and strong supervision, the system worked tolerably
well.202 And, although trade both within and between states was
somewhat impaired by the variegated money supply (households and
businesses spent and received thousands of different paper notes),
private solutions facilitated commerce.203
But as with so many aspects of the American state, the monetary
system could not meet the demands of the Civil War.204 Military
necessity compelled Congress to appropriate more and more money,
and the Treasury found that it did not have enough tax receipts to cover
its expenditures. First, Treasury Secretary Salmon Chase turned to
borrowing, draining gold and silver bullion out of the state banks. In
December 1861, when rumors spread that Britain might enter the war,
panic hit.205 With much of the country’s gold sitting in Treasury
warehouses, banks were unable to make good on their obligations.
Banks in nearly every state suspended payments on their notes and
deposit accounts.206
With neither banks nor the Treasury redeeming the country’s
paper money in coin, the Lincoln Administration prevailed on Congress
to roll back delegation by passing the Legal Tender Act. The Act was a
break with seventy-five years of practice. It authorized the government
to issue its own paper notes called “greenbacks,” expanding the money
supply directly rather than through privately operated banks. But as
the state banks started using greenbacks as reserves on which to issue
even more of their own notes, the value of the dollar dropped.
200. Indiana pioneered this approach in 1834. After Ohio and Iowa followed suit, in 1845 and
1858, respectively, see KNOX, supra note 147, at 679–80, 766–67, Illinois, Kentucky, Tennessee,
Delaware, and Vermont adopted the same type of system, see ROBERTSON, supra note 142, at 28.
201. ROBERTSON, supra note 142, at 23. Nine states outlawed banking in the 1840s and 1850s.
South Carolina, Missouri, and Ohio maintained restricted systems and partial state ownership
until the Civil War. See id.
202. See L. Carroll Root, New England Bank Currency, 2 SOUND CURRENCY, June 1, 1985, at
6–8 (noting that only three banks failed in Massachusetts between 1840 and 1865); L. Carroll Root,
New York Bank Currency, 2 SOUND CURRENCY, Feb. 1, 1895, at 24 (noting the exceptional strength
of New York’s paper currency).
203. See, e.g., J. THOMPSON, THOMPSON’S BANK NOTE AND COMMERCIAL REPORTER, Nov. 5,
1853 (assessing the relative value of various bank notes).
204. RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, YANKEE LEVIATHAN: THE ORIGINS OF CENTRAL STATE
AUTHORITY IN AMERICA, 1859-1877, at 238–303 (1990).
205. Wesley C. Mitchell, The Suspension of Specie Payments, December 1861, 7 J. POL. ECON.
289, 320 (1899).
206. Id. at 322–24. Ohio, Indiana, and Kentucky—the exceptions—all had government-run
state banking systems with private branches. Id. at 324.
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The Administration feared direct monetary expansion by the
government combined with state banking would end in disaster.207 The
natural solution—rechartering the BUS to replace greenbacks and
restrict state bank issues—was politically toxic.208 Instead, the
Administration proposed to federalize the New York Model. It argued
that the United States should charter national banks, plural, which
would issue a “uniform currency” in exchange for U.S. bonds. Congress
would not pick winners, nor would it limit the power to monetize debt
and allocate credit to just a few hands. Anyone with enough capital,
willing to abide by the rules and to subject their operations to state
oversight, would be permitted to supply a part of the nation’s money.
With the help of John Sherman, the powerful senator from Ohio, Chase
secured passage of the National Bank Act (“NBA”) on February 20,
1863. Lincoln signed it five days later.209
The Act was a compromise. Farmers and workers, especially in
the West and the South, opposed private banking and celebrated
greenbacks. They wanted public control over the money supply,210 with
money issued directly by the government.211 In their eyes, banking
delegated this public power to private actors and concentrated wealth
in the hands of special interests.212 The NBA, by continuing delegation,
was, in this respect, a conservative measure.213
At the same time, the NBA was also a radical act of creation: It
federalized the money supply by establishing the OCC as a bureau
within the Treasury Department and empowering it to charter and
supervise a new system of “national banks.”214 These banks were not
207. If notes were not convertible into gold and silver on demand, most policymakers thought
people would lose confidence in their value, triggering inflation. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 37th
Cong., 3d Sess. 842 (1863) (Statement of Sen. John Sherman).
208. See, e.g., KANE, supra note 128, at 23–24.
209. A revised version of the Act was passed in 1864, which is the version discussed herein.
See The National Bank Act, June 3, 1864, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF BANKING AND
CURRENCY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 88, at 1383, 1383–1411.
210. See GRETCHEN RITTER, GOLDBUGS AND GREENBACKS: THE ANTIMONOPOLY TRADITION
AND THE POLITICS OF FINANCE IN AMERICA, 1965-1896, at 96–98 (1999).
211. Alexander Campbell, Lecture Before the Mercantile Association of Chicago: The True
American System of Finance, Adapted to the Genius of Our Institutions, the Present Wants of the
Government, and Business Interests of the Country, and a Guaranty for the Future Integrity of
the Union (Oct. 1, 1862); ALEXANDER CAMPBELL, THE TRUE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF FINANCE: THE
RIGHTS OF LABOR AND CAPITAL, AND THE COMMON SENSE WAY OF DOING JUSTICE TO THE SOLDIERS
AND THEIR FAMILIES: NO BANKS, GREENBACKS THE EXCLUSIVE CURRENCY (1864). See also EDWARD
KELLOGG, LABOR AND CAPITAL: THE RIGHTS OF EACH SECURED AND THE WRONGS OF BOTH
ERADICATED 252 (1849) (arguing that all the money circulated in the United States should be
issued by a National Safety Fund).
212. RITTER, supra note 210, at 96–109.
213. Id. at 78.
214. The National Bank Act, June 3, 1864, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF BANKING
AND CURRENCY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 88, at 1383, 1383.
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designed to facilitate private wealth creation, but to serve as premodern
independent agencies. As Representative Samuel Hooper, the law’s
primary drafter, put it: “It will be as if the Bank of the United States
had been divided into many parts, and each part endowed with the life,
motion, and similitude of the whole . . . .”215 National banks, like the
BUS, would be privately managed to prevent overissue216 and
politicized asset allocation.217 As Senator Sumner put it: “[The national
banking system] is an instrument in the public service . . . . Is it not an
instrument? Is it not as much an instrument as your navy yard, your
arsenal, or your mint?”218 National banks are “essential instruments” of
the government, another member declared.219 The public status of
national banks is reflected in the law itself, which recaptured profits
generated by money issuance by collecting royalties220 and refers to

215. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 616 (1862) (statement of Rep. Samuel Hooper).
216. Salmon P. Chase, Letter to Horace Greeley (Jan. 28, 1863), in 3 THE SALMON P. CHASE
PAPERS 376 (1996):
A circulation issued directly by the Government cannot be made a good currency. The
difficulty is partly in the nature of the thing and partly in the nature of men. The total
difficulty is insurmountable & so says all experience. The only remaining way which
has had trial enough to warrant reasonable expectation of success is through banking
Institutions. Local Banks were tried in the war of 1812 & failed disastrously . . . . The
Bank of the United States has been twice tried & nobody is bold enough to propose a
third trial. There seems to remain only a National Free Banking System. A state Free
Banking System has been tried in New York for three million[ ] . . . people with the best
results on State credit and individual well being;
CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 842 (1863) (statement of Sen. John Sherman):
The only answer [to the question “why look at all to the interests of the banks; why not
directly issue the notes of the Government”] is that history teaches us that the public
faith of a nation alone is not sufficient to maintain a paper currency. There must be a
combination between the interests of private individuals and the Government;
John Sherman, The National Banking Project; The Certainty with Which It Will Give Us a Sound
National Currency, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1863, at 4 (“The well-guarded Free Banking system
proposed by Mr. C[hase], commends itself in that it promises the needed currency. The central
idea of that measure is the establishment of one sound, uniform circulation, of equal value
throughout the country, upon the foundation of National credit, combined with private capital.”).
217. U.S. TREASURY SEC’Y, REP. ON THE STATE OF THE FINANCES FOR THE YEAR ENDING JUNE
30, 1962, REFERRED TO THE H. COMM. ON FIN., 37TH CONG., 16–17 (3d Sess. 1862) (explaining that
when the federal fiscal stance returned to a “healthy normal,” it would be impossible for the federal
government, by spending money, to provide greenbacks “in sufficient amounts for the wants of the
people,” forcing the government to lend notes into circulation, which “would convert the treasury
into a government bank, with all its hazards and mischiefs”).
218. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1894 (1864) (statement of Sen. Charles Sumner).
219. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2200 (1864) (statement of Sen. Jacob Collamer).
220. Salmon P. Chase, Letter to John Bigelow (Oct. 7, 1862), in 3 THE SALMON P. CHASE
PAPERS, supra note 216, at 290, 293; CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3rd. Sess. 1146–47 (1863)
(statement of Rep. John B. Alley) (arguing that “the people are entitled” to the profit from money
creation, and “the government is really the party who should have all the profit of the circulation”
and is “entitled to the whole benefit”).
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each bank as a “franchise.”221
National banks were also given standardized names (reflecting
their status as government instrumentalities). Thus, the first bank to
secure a charter in Baltimore was the First National Bank of Baltimore
and the fourth bank to secure a charter in New York was the Fourth
National Bank of New York.222 And the NBA required national banks
to deposit United States bonds with the comptroller and authorized the
comptroller to issue notes to each bank in an amount equivalent to
ninety percent of the value of the deposited bonds.223 The NBA required
national banks to maintain specie reserves equal to between fifteen and
twenty-five percent of their monetary liabilities. 224 And it imposed
supervision, copying key elements of New York’s law. Specifically, the
Act empowered the comptroller to “thorough[ly]” inspect national banks
“as often as shall be deemed necessary or proper” to depose the officers
and agents of the bank under oath and to publish a full and detailed
report.225 If the examiners identified legal violations,226 or if a bank
refused to redeem its circulating notes in gold and silver coin,227 the
comptroller could bring suit against the bank and seek to dissolve it.
The Act also delegated a series of plenary approval powers to the
comptroller,228 which meant banks often needed government
cooperation to operate effectively.229
Secretary Chase imagined that the new banks would completely
replace the existing state banks, forcing those banks to convert to
221. The National Bank Act, June 3, 1864, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF BANKING
supra note 88, at 1383, 1385 (“Such association shall have
power to adopt a corporate seal, and shall have succession by the name designated in its
organization certificate . . . unless the franchise shall be forfeited by a violation of this act . . . .”)
(emphasis added); 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Second) (noting that the “franchise becomes forfeited by reason
of violation of law”). See also CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1412 (1864) (statement of Rep.
John Pruyn) (noting that national banks operate under a “franchise granted by the Government”);
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2204 (1864) (statement of Sen. Edgar Cowan) (noting that
national banks possess a “franchise” granted by the federal government).
222. See ROBERTSON, supra note 142, at 49.
223. The National Bank Act, June 3, 1864, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF BANKING
AND CURRENCY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 88, at 1383, 1391–92 (sections nineteen and
twenty-one of the National Bank Act).
224. Id. at 1396–97 (sections thirty-one and thirty-two).
225. Id. at 1407 (section fifty-four).
226. Id. (section fifty-three).
227. Id. at 1396–97, 1403–06 (sections-thirty two and forty-six through fifty).
228. For example, comptroller approval was required before a bank could reduce (or increase)
its equity capital. Id. at 1388 (section thirteen).
229. For example, here is how Senator Steele of New York described the supervisory authority
embedded in the original NBA—modest by comparison to many of the states at the time: “[These
banks] will be entirely at the mercy of the Treasury Department, and therefore to that extent
subject to its control and dictation . . . .” CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1432 (1864)
(statement of Sen. William Steele).
AND CURRENCY IN THE UNITED STATES,
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national charters or disband.230 In 1865, Congress imposed a prohibitive
ten percent tax on state bank notes, and by 1868, the number of state
banks had fallen to less than 250 (an eighty-five percent reduction).231
“The banks created by the national banking act,” the Department of
Justice explained fifty years later, “were, and were designed to be, local
institutions and independent of each other, but under national control
and supervision. Nationalization without centralization was the
keynote of the law.” 232 The plan was “so radical in its character and so
destructive to the existing system of state banks,” one of its supporters
explained, that it was explicable only as an incident of war.233
While the passage of the NBA marked the birth of modern
banking law, the Act did not give the OCC all its modern powers. Like
in New York, these would come in time.234 Formally, for many decades,
the comptroller could act only when examiners identified violations of
the Act’s bright-line rules. In practice, however, and as opponents of the
NBA anticipated prior to enactment,235 the comptroller exercised
substantial informal discretionary authority, more than was common
in most states. Supervisory letters, precursors to today’s MRAs, were
routine.236 Minor rule violations were widespread,237 and bankers who
violated the Act faced severe sanctions; bank directors faced personal
liability, and bank employees faced criminal sanctions. 238 Rule
violations were also grounds for examiners to revoke a bank’s charter.
Accordingly, the comptroller used them as leverage.239 “Strictly
speaking,” an official OCC history explained, “the Comptroller had to
rely on cooperation from officers and directors of banks in order to
230. HAMMOND, supra note 104, at 725, 728.
231. ROBERTSON, supra note 142, at 53.
232. Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings on S. Res. 84 and S. Res. 239 Before a Subcomm. of
the Comm. on Banking and Currency, 72d Cong. 2032 (1933) (opinion of Frederick W. Lehmann,
Solicitor General).
233. HAMMOND, supra note 104, at 725 (quoting Senator Sherman).
234. Indeed, as at other points in U.S. history, supervision was fiercely contested: bankers and
others fought, usually unsuccessfully, to limit government oversight. See, e.g., supra note 229.
235. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1433 (1864) (statement of Rep. William Steele)
(“Under this power of examination any one of these institutions that happens to incur the
displeasure of the Department can be broken down [through repeated, onerous, and
costly examinations].”).
236. KANE, supra note 128, at 465 (“Here comes the man who writes those letters to the banks
telling them how they should conduct their business.”).
237. According to one longtime official, “[P]robably seventy-five per cent[ ] of the examiners’
reports, and about the same percentage of reports of condition made by the banks, disclosed
violations of law of one kind or another . . . .” Id. at 366.
238. The National Bank Act, June 3, 1864, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF BANKING
AND CURRENCY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 88, at 1383, 1407 (section fifty-three, directors);
id. at 1407–08 (section fifty-five, employees).
239. KANE, supra note 128, at 366.
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correct [unsafe practices]. Nevertheless, the growing prestige of the
Office and the weight of authority that grew with it, plus the latent
threat of charter revocation, soon gave the Comptroller . . . adequate
coercive power.”240
The comptroller’s monetary outsourcing function was obvious to
both advocates and critics of the new system.241 Indeed, Senator
Sherman justified the Act, and its preemption of state banking, by
reference to the Constitution’s monetary clauses. “No state,” Sherman
explained, “has the power to interfere with this exclusive authority in
Congress to regulate the national currency.”242 “If you give to an
individual or a corporation[, as the states had,] the power to issue . . .
note[s] as money at a time when he is not restrained by the necessity of
paying in gold and silver,” Sherman argued, “you give him practically
the power to coin money.” Thus, “[w]henever specie payments are
suspended,” as they were during the War, “the power to issue a bank
note is the same as the power to coin money.” 243 This is a privilege,
Sherman continued, “that no nation can safely surrender to individuals
or banks.”244 On Sherman’s view, the NBA recaptured control over this
privilege and franchised it out to new nationally chartered entities
because “history teaches us that the public faith of a nation alone is not
sufficient to maintain a paper currency.”245 Rather than rely on
Treasury notes, Sherman concluded, Congress might instead
“combin[e] . . . the interests of private individuals and the Government”
by establishing national banks and putting them under the supervision
of special government officials.246
The comptroller’s office shared Sherman’s view—supervision
was entailed by the outsourcing model. As Comptroller A. Barton
Hepburn explained in his annual report to Congress in 1892: “[I]t [is]
the duty of the Government to provide and regulate a circulating
medium for the people, [and accordingly,] the Government examines
and supervises [national] banks to see that all laws in respect to

240. ROBERTSON, supra note 142, at 71 n.13.
241. See Robert Hockett, Money’s Past Is Fintech’s Future: Wildcat Crypto, the Digital Dollar,
and Citizen Central Banking, 2 STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y 221, 226 (2019) (arguing that
“ ‘comptroller’ is merely archaic English for ‘controller’ ” and that the “OCC, housed in Treasury,
was effectively [established to serve as] the ‘controller’—the administrator—of our national
currency system”).
242. HAMMOND, supra note 104, at 726.
243. Speech by John Sherman [Ohio] on the National Banking Bill, February 10, 1863,
reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF BANKING AND CURRENCY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra
note 88, at 1355, 1360.
244. Id. at 1361.
245. Id. at 1362.
246. Id.
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circulation are fully complied with.”247 And as banks “are so intimately
connected with business transactions and their soundness so essential
to business prosperity . . . governmental control has gone one step
further and seeks to protect the public against loss—to protect a bank’s
creditors.”248 According to Hepburn, while “[t]he affirmative action of
the banks in their competition for business is left to the enterprise of
their managers, prompted by the desires of shareholders for dividends,”
it is “[t]he function of the Government . . . to restrain, [and] to [e]nsure
good banking, by enforcing the prohibitions against unsafe practices,
which the law provides.”249
2. The Federal Reserve Act
There were two major flaws in the national banking system.
First, neither the comptroller nor the Congress had the ability to
actively coordinate national bank money issuance, a problem that was
particularly acute during periods of stress. Second, the rise of checking
accounts led to a resurgence of state banks, and state banks were not
subject to federal oversight. Although Congress had tried to drive the
states out of the money business, it overlooked the fact that deposit
accounts, and checks drawn on them, could substitute for notes. In the
late 1880s and 1890s the number of state banks grew once again as an
increasing portion of commerce was transacted using deposits. The
Panic of 1907—which featured runs on this account money—brought
the point home. In its wake, Congress established a National Monetary
Commission to figure out what had gone wrong and to come up with a
solution. The commission concluded, among other things, that notes
were now a small part of the money supply and that what had become
the larger part—deposit accounts—was not sufficiently regulated.250
Officials recognized that for a supervisory scheme to work it had to be
tailored to the dominant form of money in circulation; in this case, it
had to superintend deposit expansion by state chartered entities.
In 1913, to improve federal control of deposit money, especially
at the state level, Congress passed the Federal Reserve Act—an “Act To
provide for the establishment of Federal reserve banks, to furnish an
elastic currency, to afford means of rediscounting commercial paper,
[and] to establish a more effective supervision of banking in the United
247. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ANNUAL REPORT, 52d Cong., 2d Sess., at 40 (Dec. 5,
1892) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT (1892)].
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See GEORGE E. BARNETT, STATE BANKS AND TRUST COMPANIES: SINCE THE PASSAGE OF
THE NATIONAL-BANK ACT 11–12 (Nat’l Monetary Comm’n ed., 1911).
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States”—reasserting once again the federal government’s power over
the nation’s monetary architecture.251 The Act established the Federal
Reserve System, a monetary authority composed of a government Board
in Washington and regional Federal Reserve Banks (“FRBs”) situated
in twelve “districts.” Oversight of the FRBs was split between the Board
and state and national banks in each district. These “member banks”—
the national banks plus those state banks opting to join the System—
appoint six of the nine directors of each FRB. The FRBs issue a paper
money—Federal reserve notes—which is an “obligation[] of the United
States . . . receivable by all national and member banks and Federal
reserve banks for all taxes, customs, and other public dues.” 252 The
FRBs would also coordinate the clearing and settlement of payments by
check.253 And banks joining the System as “members” are subject to
examination and required to maintain specie reserves against their
account money.254
The Board was the lynchpin of the Act, and it revolutionized the
AMS by giving public officials, acting through the FRBs, the ability to
loosen or tighten the ability of banks to expand the money supply. Wall
Street was adamantly opposed to this partial de-delegation—the
country’s bankers thought that the Federal Reserve System should
operate like the BUS, with a board controlled by directors selected by
private shareholders. But William Jennings Bryan, who had spent the
better part of the prior two decades fighting for democratic control of
the money supply, insisted on a “Government Board.” For thenSecretary of State Bryan, his ally Treasury Secretary William McAdoo,
and the Democratic members of Congress who wrote the actual bill that
became law, banks, including state banks, exercised delegated power.255
As Senator Burton put it, in the final debates before passage: “Those
engaged in the business of banking are but the agents of the people. In

251. Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 64-43, § 16, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
252. Id. §§ 2, 10.
253. Id. § 16.
254. Id. § 19 (requiring twelve to eighteen percent for demand deposits and five percent for
time deposits). The Act also amended the NBA to require fixed salaries for bank examiners and
impose strict conflict of interest rules. Id. §§ 21-22. In doing so, the Act extended the “salary
revolution in American government” to the banking agencies, see NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST
THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780-1940 (2013),
following decades of efforts by successive comptrollers to persuade Congress to eliminate the
earlier fee-based model, see KANE, supra note 128, at 240–41.
255. See, e.g., William Jennings Bryan, “The Cross of Gold,” July 8, 1896, in 3 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF BANKING AND CURRENCY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 88, at 2009, 2011–12
(“[T]he right . . . to issue money is a function of government . . . it is a part of sovereignty, and can
no more with safety be delegated to private individuals than we could afford to delegate to private
individuals the power to make penal statutes or levy taxes.”).
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no line should a higher standard of care and integrity be required.”256 It
was because banks were agents of the public that the public, acting
through the Board, should be empowered to oversee bank issues and
limit bank risks, both at the state and federal levels.
C. Roosevelt and the New Deal Consolidation
But for a variety of reasons, the Fed failed to tame the evergrowing mass of state banks, and competitive deregulation between the
states and the federal government eroded separations and precipitated
a wave of bank failures in 1932 and 1933.257 In 1933, the AMS almost
collapsed. Calls rose up for Congress to nationalize the money supply.
Instead, Congress once again steered a middle course and reaffirmed
the AMS: it restored the separation of banking and commerce that had
deteriorated in the 1920s, it explicitly backstopped bank deposits for
the first time, and it strengthened supervision, importing New York’s
safety and soundness law into the U.S. Code. Supervision was at the
heart of the New Deal consolidation: it was how President Roosevelt
justified continued monetary outsourcing to the American people. This
Section examines Roosevelt’s reforms and reveals the federal
legislature’s persistent commitment to informal supervisory oversight
stretching to the present day, even in the face of efforts to temper other
aspects of the administrative state.
1. The Banking Act of 1933
Contemporary supervisory law was built in the depths of the
Great Depression and in the fifty years that followed. Congress decided
that both Lincoln’s national banking plan and Wilson’s Federal Reserve
System placed too much monetary control to private hands.
Accordingly, it reclaimed powers that had been delegated to bank
shareholders and managers by, for the first time, permitting the
256. 60 CONG. REC. 686 (1913) (statement of Sen. Theodore E. Burton).
257. See generally Operation of the National and Federal Reserve Banking Systems: Hearings
on S. 4115 Before the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 358, 395 (1932)
(statement of Eugene Meyer, Governor, Federal Reserve Board, Wash., D.C.):
[E]ffective supervision of banking in this country has been seriously affected by
competition between member and non-member banks . . . [and] competition between
the State and National banking systems has resulted in weakening both steadily.
National banks, which were granted limited powers by the NBA, pushed into various forms of
financial commerce in the 1910s and 1920s. See, e.g., ARTHUR E. WILMARTH, JR., TAMING THE
MEGABANKS: WHY WE NEED A NEW GLASS STEAGALL ACT 31–32 (2020); VINCENT P. CAROSSO,
INVESTMENT BANKING IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 279–99 (1970). They also succeeded in loosening
branching requirements. See CAROSSO, supra, at 242 (eighty-seven banks had branches in 1900;
775 banks did in 1928).
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banking agencies to take remedial actions whenever they determined
banks were operating in an unsafe or unsound manner.
Strengthening discretionary bank supervision was a priority for
President Roosevelt—one of the few specific financial measures he
articulated as a candidate (along with restoring the separation of
banking and securities dealing)—and it helped him fend off more
radical proposals.258 As Roosevelt put it in his inaugural address:
“[T]here must be a strict supervision of all banking . . . so that there will
be an end to speculation with other people’s money; and there must be
provision for an adequate but sound currency.”259
Soon after Roosevelt took office, Congress authorized the Fed to
remove officers and directors who “continued unsafe or unsound
practices in conducting the business” of member banks260—just as
Congress had empowered the president to remove the heads of agencies
like the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Fed Board itself.261
Congress also empowered the OCC, whenever a director or officer of a
national bank violated a law or “continued unsafe or unsound
practices,” to refer the matter to the Fed for removal proceedings.262 The
OCC had been seeking this power for nearly forty years. “For
many . . . offenses,” Comptroller John Skelton Williams complained in
1914, “the only penalty which can be enforced by the Comptroller’s
office is the forfeiture of the bank’s charter by suit in the United States
court.”263 But, often this “would prove a great hardship to innocent
stockholders and depositors, and [thus] can only be resorted to with

258. See FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, LOOKING FORWARD 227 (1933) (“The events of the past
three years prove that the supervision of national banks for the protection of depositors has been
ineffective. I propose much more rigid supervision.”).
259. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Inaugural Address (March 4, 1933), in 2 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND
ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 13 (1938).
260. This is the second mention of the standard in federal law. Safety and soundness first
appeared in section 4 of the Emergency Banking Act of 1933. The Emergency Banking Act, March
9, 1933, reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF BANKING AND CURRENCY IN THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 88, at 2697, 2698. Its monetary meaning is indisputable. Id. (authorizing the secretary
of the Treasury to restrict banking activities in an emergency so as to “provide for the safer and
more effective operation of the National Banking System”; “preserve for the people the full benefits
of the currency provided for by the Congress through the National Banking System”; and “relieve
interstate commerce of the burdens and obstructions resulting from the receipt on an unsound and
unsafe basis of deposits subject to withdrawal by check” (emphasis added)).
261. See Manners & Menand, supra note 151, at 74.
262. See Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, § 30, 48 Stat. 162. Senator Carter Glass, this
provision’s champion, thought that authoring the Fed to remove bad bankers would bolster support
for America’s disaggregated banking system and satisfy those who believed that banks had failed
because of unprofessional conduct and reckless management. SUSAN KENNEDY, THE BANKING
CRISIS OF 1933, at 209 (1973).
263. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ANNUAL REPORT, 63d Cong., 3d Sess., at 17
(Dec. 7, 1914).
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much reluctance.”264 According to A. Barton Hepburn, comptroller in
1892, “[t]he existence of the power [to remove officers and directors]
would deter many who now keep the letter, only to violate the spirit of
the law.”265
Just as importantly, Congress established the FDIC and gave it
the power to supervise participating banks and, if needed, put those
banks into receivership as a “means to reasonably protect the
[insurance fund] against the consequences of unsound or dangerous
practices on the part of insured banks.” Congress empowered the FDIC
to do this whenever its board concluded that an insured bank continued
“unsafe or unsound practices in conducting the business of the bank.”266
Deposit insurance helped to federalize bank regulation. It also put the
government’s imprimatur on banks’ monetary liabilities.267 Deposits
appeared less like a private product, and their supervision by federal
officials was now a condition in the insurance contract as well as in
national bank charters.
The decision by Congress to extend oversight through deposit
insurance, to substantially strengthen agency power by tying new
remedies to discretionary determinations regarding “unsafe and
unsound practices,” and to restore separations, which had eroded over
the prior thirty years,268 reflects a compromise struck between bankers
and businessmen and those who thought that private actors should be
stripped of their ability to expand the money supply.269 As Albert C.
264. Id.
265. ANNUAL REPORT (1892), supra note 247, at 43.
266. Banking Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-305, § 101(i)(1), 49 Stat. 684 (codified as amended at
12 U.S.C. § 228). As Carter Glass put it, the law “authorized” the FDIC to “discontinue the
insurance of banks which offend against sound policies, and to dismiss them from the privileges of
the Corporation.” 79 CONG. REC. 11,776 (1935).
267. Mark D. Flood, The Great Deposit Insurance Debate, 74 FED. RSRV. BANK ST. LOUIS REV.
51, 70–71 (1992) (recounting Senator’s Glass’s effort to “unify” banking regulation at the federal
level through federal deposit insurance).
268. Politically, Congress’s efforts to enhance supervision actually depended on restoring
separations: arch segregationists voted for the dramatic expansion in federal power because the
reforms also pushed ownership and management of banks back into local hands. IRA KATZNELSON,
FEAR ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 256 (2013). Southern banks were run
by southerners and operated “entirely on segregated principles.” Id.
269. See, e.g., Rex Tugwell, The Compromising Roosevelt, 6 W. POL. Q. 320, 333 (1953)
(describing the Act as “a compromise” and arguing that “the humiliating compromises concluded
during this era with the financiers were mistakes”). Many considered the Act an interim
measure—a partial corrective that would have to suffice until Congress and the Roosevelt
Administration could come up with a permanent solution. See, e.g., PHILLIPS, supra note 134, at
59 (stressing that the Act would be only a “bridge or a transition rather than . . . a permanent
solution for the situation” (quoting Adolf Berle)); HELEN BURNS, THE AMERICAN BANKING
COMMUNITY AND NEW DEAL BANKING REFORMS 1933-1935, at 97 (1974) (explaining that the Act
“was compromise legislation designed to correct obvious defects in the federal banking laws and to
afford a degree of protection to the bank depositors of the country” and that “[i]ndications were,
that at a later date, the administration would again turn to bank reform”).
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Agnew, general counsel of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,
put it: “Either the bankers of this country will realize that they are
guardians of the moneys committed to their charge and will conduct
their business accordingly, or banking [i.e., money augmentation]
will cease to be a private enterprise and will become a purely
governmental function.”270
Indeed, in May 1933, Congress revived greenbacks, authorizing
the Treasury secretary to issue up to $3 billion in new notes. 271 And not
just the organized left, but a significant number of academics and
advisors to Roosevelt thought that the President should go even further
and eliminate “fractional reserve” banking altogether. For example,
Rex Tugwell, a Columbia economist and influential member of the
President’s “Brains Trust,” argued that the government would be a
more effective banker than the profit-seeking business community.272
Eight prominent professors at the University of Chicago proposed
shifting to “narrow” banks, which would be permitted to invest only in
government-issued currency.273 In the words of the economist Henry
Simons, the so-called “Chicago Plan” would secure the “abolition of
private credit as an element in the circulating media” and the
“concentration of complete and direct control over the quantity of media
in the hands of the central monetary authority.”274
Roosevelt steered clear of these measures and instead
strengthened the original AMS. But while Roosevelt—like Lincoln and
Chase (and Hamilton and Gallatin and Van Buren)—“did not believe in
a government-owned and -operated bank,”275 and while he too rejected
the greenback alternative, he did believe that banks were extensions of
the government. “Bankers are not merely partners of the government,”
Roosevelt at one point planned to tell a gathering of the American
Bankers Association in 1934:
The new relationship enters into the picture—the relationship of agency. Banks and
bankers are . . . in a very true sense the agents of government itself. Why is this so? All
you have to do is to read the history of the United States. You are probably at least as
familiar as I am with the growth of the control of government over banking. . . .
[Continually,] Federal supervision was strengthened. . . . [Now, banks] are once and for
all under the supervision and the agency of the government of the United States. . . . The
270. Albert C. Agnew, Some Thoughts About the Future of American Banking, CAL. BANKER,
June 1933, at 193, 194–95.
271. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-10, § 43, 48 Stat. 52.
272. KENNEDY, supra note 262, at 167. See also Charles Albert Hawkins, Our Present Banking
Situation and the Remedy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1933 (arguing for government control of banking).
273. PHILLIPS, supra note 134, at 47–48.
274. Id. at 50.
275. BURNS, supra note 269, at 99 (“He believed that depositors should be protected against
bad bankers, that banking should be strictly supervised, and that the ethics of banking should
be maintained.”).
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nearest parallel that I can think of is the example of Trustees appointed by one of our
Courts to administer an Estate or a Trust. These Trustees must operate under certain
definite rules laid down by the Court and, at the same time, the Trustees are responsible
to the beneficiaries of the Trust itself.276

As in New York, the basis for this agency relationship was
monetary. “We had a bad banking situation,” Roosevelt explained in his
first fireside chat:
Some of our bankers had shown themselves either incompetent or dishonest in their
handling of the people’s funds. They had used the money entrusted to them in
speculations and unwise loans. . . . It was the Government’s job to straighten out this
situation and do it as quickly as possible.277

After Roosevelt closed the banks, he assured people he would reopen
them once they were “found to be sound,” meaning once people could
rest assured that their bank money was as good as base money.278
Modern supervision was built to tame “once and for all” an open access
monetary system.
2. The Quiet Period
In the decades that followed, modern supervisory practice took
hold even as procedural reformers sought to constrain the growing
powers of the administrative state. Indeed, throughout these years the
“federal control of banking” was widely lauded with supervisors
attentive to the health and viability of their franchisees and bankers
careful not to take advantage of their monetary powers for short-term
gain. Two developments during this “Quiet Period” bear special
attention: (i) the approving treatment of administrative reformers of
the banking agencies and (ii) the repeated efforts by Congress to
reinforce and strengthen informal supervisory power.
a. The Administrative Procedure Act
Before the ink was dry on Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation,
skeptics were working to rein in what they saw as the excesses of the
expanded administrative state. They were particularly concerned with
procedural fairness and judicial review of agency action. But they
treated the banking agencies differently. Banks were not like other

276. Roosevelt, supra note 46, at 2–3 (emphases added). The speech as delivered did not
include these lines.
277. President Roosevelt Delivers His First “Fireside Chat,” March 12, 1933, reprinted in 4
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF BANKING AND CURRENCY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 88, at
2709, 2711.
278. Id. at 2709.
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businesses; they were the government’s monetary instrumentalities,
and their overseers were entitled to special solicitude.279
For example, in 1940, the Justice Department established a
special committee on administrative procedure, which published a
report and a series of fourteen monographs on administrative agencies,
including two on the banking agencies. Although the committee
recommended that some of its general reform proposals apply to the
banking agencies, it otherwise endorsed the informal and “summary”
nature of supervisory power, which it explicitly recognized as a
longstanding feature of American banking law.280
As the committee put it, “The nature of banking and of the public
interest in banks shape the procedural aspects of bank supervision in
forms different from those encountered in other branches of
administrative regulation.” In the committee’s view, supervision was
procedurally tolerable because the structure of the banking system
constrained both the banks and the agencies:
The paradox in the situation is that the sanctions are so compelling that the authorities
almost never use them. Because the banks are so important in an industrial-commercial
economy, compulsive steps [by the agencies] which might shake confidence [in the banks]
are withheld. Although there is in fact an iron hand within the velvet glove of the banking
authorities, the glove is seldom removed.281

The committee was aware that the banking agencies were opaque.282 It
also recognized that banks were “subjected to a general supervision
through examination the intensity of which has few, in any, parallels in

279. See, e.g., Joint Statement on Behalf of the Minority of the Attorney General’s Committee
on Administrative Procedure: Hearings on S. 674, S. 675, and S. 918 Before a Subcomm. of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong. 1394 (1941) (noting that the Treasury points to its “fiscal and
monetary functions” in requesting that the comptroller of the currency “be exempted in connection
with the regulation of national banks” from the formal procedures in the APA).
280. ATT’Y GEN.’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROC., Federal Control of Banking: Comptroller of the
Currency and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES PT. 13, at 2 (1940) [hereinafter Federal Control of Banking]. “Banks and
banking presented complex problems calling for special knowledge and continuing and detailed
supervision, not possible for either Congress or the courts . . . .” ATT’Y GEN.’S COMM. ON A DMIN.
PROC., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, APPOINTED BY THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL, AT THE REQUEST OF THE PRESIDENT, TO INVESTIGATE THE NEED FOR PROCEDURAL
REFORM IN VARIOUS ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS AND TO SUGGEST IMPROVEMENTS THEREIN 15
(1941). These conclusions are consistent with those reached by the Brownlow Commission. See
THE PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE UNITED STATES 40–41 (1937) (explaining that banks are “federal business corporations”
chartered “by a supervisory agency,” that their statutes confine “their operations to a unitary
purpose and describe their organization, powers, and relationships in considerable detail,” and
that these “special supervisory agencies” should “give continuous and careful scrutiny to [banks’]
affairs,” if necessary, independently from executive control).
281. Federal Control of Banking, supra note 280, at 18.
282. Id. at 43. (“[T]he exercise of supervisory powers over banks has traditionally been
attended by a secrecy antithetical to the publicity which marks most regulatory activities.”).
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other fields of regulation.”283 But according to the committee, the
“intimate nature of this type of control precludes its exercise through a
formal procedure.”284 The committee’s conclusions were also consistent
with those reached by a major reform initiative spearheaded by the
American Bar Association. That initiative exempted the banking
agencies from a law that would have created a special appeals court for
administrative agencies.285
The reform that ultimately prevailed—the APA—preserves
supervision. This is because the APA’s procedural protections are
triggered by formal actions, while the banking agencies are designed to
proceed informally.286 Moreover, when the banking agencies do take
formal actions, they are often subject to a generous standard of
review.287 In 1946, the Fed even argued that its decision to remove a
banker from office was unreviewable under section 10 of the APA
because removal was “committed to agency discretion” by law.288
Although the Supreme Court did not accept this argument,289 two
Justices thought the Board’s judgment was reviewable only for abuse of
discretion,290 and the agencies have successfully avoided judicial review
on these grounds in other cases.291
Meanwhile, both tacitly and explicitly, leading administrative
law scholars acknowledged that supervision was distinctive. For
283. Id.
284. Id. Even in agencies like the Federal Communications Commission, which dispenses
licenses, applications can only be denied after opportunity for a formal hearing, which serves as a
basis for judicial review. Id. By contrast, the committee noted, applications to organize national
banks are denied without any opportunity for hearing. Id. The Committee concluded that the
inutility of public hearing procedure in banking was well recognized and that “ex parte
investigations may constitute an adequate basis for decision.” Id.
285. See Landis, supra note 49, at 1084–85 (explaining that the banking agencies along with
a handful of other agencies were exempt from review under the terms of the Walter-Logan bill
proposed by the American Bar Association to reform the administrative state).
286. See Davis, supra note 122, at 193 (lamenting that the APA “by ignoring the supervising
power, has left untouched some of the most troublesome areas of the federal regulatory process”).
This was likely intentional. The Treasury Department requested that the comptroller be fully
exempted. See also Joint Statement on Behalf of the Minority of the Attorney General’s Committee
on Administrative Procedure: Hearings on S. 674, S. 675, and S. 918 Before a Subcomm. of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong. 1394 (1941).
287. See, e.g., Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973) (holding that the comptroller’s decision
to deny an application to form a national bank is subject to arbitrary and capricious review, that
the court cannot force the agency to hold a hearing, and that it must uphold the comptroller’s
decision to deny to issue the charter because the relevant community was already fully banked if
there is evidence to support that conclusion in the administrative record).
288. Brief for the Petitioners at 28–34, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. v. Agnew, 329
U.S. 441 (1946) (No. 66), 1946 WL 50159, at *28–34 (1946).
289. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys. v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441, 444 (1947).
290. Id. at 449 (Rutledge, J., concurring). According to Justices Rutledge and Frankfurter,
“Congress has committed the [banking] system’s operation to [the Board’s] hands.” Id. at 450.
291. See, e.g., Jones v. Off. of Comptroller of Currency, 983 F. Supp. 197, 203 (D.D.C. 1997).
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example, when James Landis reviewed administrative agencies in
1960, he left the banking agencies out entirely.292 And Kenneth Culp
Davis wrote in 1966: “I have long been and continue to be an admirer of
the manner in which the banking agencies have effectively used
sensible systems of supervision and have generally avoided the
cumbersome procedure of formal adjudication.”293
This positive treatment is perhaps unsurprising given that, for
most of American history, administrative authority was widely
perceived, not as a threat to liberty, but as “a means of protecting liberty
and the public interest against private power.”294 And banks were an
example of such power in a government-backed form and the source of
intense political dispute up until the New Deal.
It is likely for that reason that the Supreme Court in 1963
endorsed supervisory
governance as perhaps the “most
successful . . . system[ ] of economic regulation” to which “we may owe,
in part, the virtual disappearance of bank failures from the American
economic scene.”295 The “governmental controls of American banking,”
the Court explained, “are manifold . . . [b]ut perhaps the most effective
weapon of federal regulation of banking is the broad visitatorial power”
with its “frequent and intensive” examinations permitting “virtually a
day-to-day surveillance of the American banking system.”296
According to the Court, “As a result of the existence of [a] panoply of
sanctions, recommendations by the agencies concerning banking
practices tend to be followed by bankers without the necessity of formal
compliance proceedings.”297
b. The FISA
If the years leading up and through the passage of the APA
promised that bank supervision would remain an important part of
American public administration, the 1960s reaffirmed that
commitment. During this decade, Congress passed the Financial
Institutions Supervisory Act (“FISA”), giving the banking agencies,
among other things, the power to issue cease and desist orders targeting
292. JAMES LANDIS, 86TH CONG., REP. ON THE REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENTELECT (Comm. Print 1960).
293. Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Procedure in the Regulation of Banking, 31 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 713, 715 (1966). Davis was also critical of the banking agencies. He thought, for
example, that their decisions on chartering and branching should be more “open” to public review.
Id. at 713.
294. WHITE, supra note 49, at 464.
295. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 330 (1963).
296. Id. at 327, 329.
297. Id. at 330.
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practices that, in the opinion of the agencies, are unsafe or unsound.298
This authority allowed the agencies to force banks, in their discretion,
to change aspects of their business, from hiring to underwriting to
balance sheet management.299
Congress passed the FISA at the behest of the Johnson
Administration, which was concerned about risky bank lending that
was difficult for the agencies to combat using their existing toolkit. The
Administration explained that the “supervisory agencies in varying
degrees have been seriously handicapped in their efforts to prevent
irresponsible and undesirable practices” because the remedies were too
“drastic” and “cumbersome.” In other words, it was hard to threaten
bankers with severe sanctions like removal just for aggressively
pursuing profits.
Congress, in granting the “administration’s request for
additional flexible and effective supervisory powers,” justified the move
on monetary grounds, once again adopting an outsourcing model. The
“vital importance of [a] sound and effective system of banks,” the
Senate’s FISA report explained, “is clear” as the “banking system is a
fundamental part of our monetary system and the Nation’s $130 billion
of demand deposits represents the principal element in the Nation’s
money supply.”300 Wright Patman, the chairman of the House Banking
Committee, explicitly invoked the Constitution’s monetary clauses.301
298. Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966, Pub. L. 89-965, § 202(b)(1), 80 Stat. 1028
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (b)).
299. Congress, in drafting the FISA, relied on a memorandum by John Horne, the chairman
of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. Financial Institutions Supervisory and Insurance Act of
1966: Hearings on S. 3158 and S. 3695 Before the H. Comm. on Banking and the Currency, 89th
Cong. 49 (1966). Horne explained that “safety and soundness” was a legal standard and that “[f]or
this reason, it would be virtually impossible to attempt to catalog within a single all-inclusive or
rigid definition the broad spectrum of activities” that it embraces. Id. Indeed, the “formulation of
such a definition would probably operate to exclude those practices not set out in the definition,
even though they might be highly injurious to an institution under a given set of facts
or circumstances or a scheme developed by unscrupulous operators to avoid the reach of law.”
Id. at 49–50.
[A] particular activity not necessarily unsafe or unsound in every instance may be so
when considered in the light of all relevant facts. Thus, what may be an acceptable
practice for an institution with a strong reserve position, such as concentration in
higher risk lending, may well be unsafe or unsound for a marginal operation.
Id. at 49. Horne nonetheless offered something of a definition:
Generally speaking, an “unsafe or unsound practice” embraces any action, or lack of
action, which is contrary to generally accepted standards of prudent operation, the
possible consequences of which, if continued, would be abnormal risk or loss or damage
to an institution, its shareholders, or the agencies administering the insurance funds.
Id. at 50.
300. S. REP. NO. 89-1482, at 5 (1966).
301. 112 CONG. REC. 24,983 (1966) (Statement of Rep. Wright Patman) (arguing in favor of 12
U.S.C. § 1818 on the grounds that “we in Congress, in carrying out our mandate under article I,
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The FISA empowered the agencies to make case-by-case
judgments about bank operations. “To be effective,” one Fed official
explained, the agencies “must scrupulously avoid imposing conditions
‘too quickly and too great,’ but he must be even more alert to avoid
committing the unpardonable sin of bank supervision of doing ‘too little,
too late.’ ”302 For example, in a bank where asset quality is
deteriorating, a supervisor must “try to determine whether there had
been a weakening in the loan servicing procedures or in the bank’s basic
lending policies.”303 And if a supervisor finds “[a] noticeable increase” in
problem loans, the agency might issue “a transmittal letter urging the
directors to review the bank’s lending policies and to take such action
as is necessary to obtain additional security for weak loans, reductions
or definite repayment programs.”304
This sort of authority is difficult to explain if we view banks as
private businesses working primarily to generate returns for their
shareholders. But it is perfectly intelligible if we recognize that banks
work primarily for the public as part of a system to augment the money
supply for the benefit of the nation’s households and businesses. This
theory of banking, the one that has grounded the AMS for more than
150 years, does not see banks as private entities. Instead, it sees banks
as franchisees, serving a key role in economic governance.
c. Further Statutory Enhancements
Even as policymakers lost sight of this theory of banking and
conflict emerged between banks and the banking agencies, Congress
continued to buttress supervisory governance.305 To take just a few
examples, in 1978, Congress passed the Financial Institutions
Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act, authorizing the agencies to
issue cease-and-desist orders against individuals, levy civil money
penalties against both institutions and individuals, and remove
executives in a greater range of circumstances.306 In 1983, Congress

section 8, clause 5, of the Constitution to assure the public of a sound monetary system, must be
constantly alert to possible weaknesses in our financial system”).
302. Orville O. Wyrick, The General Nature of Bank Supervision, in BANK SUPERVISION 1, 5
(Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 1963).
303. Wilbur H. Isbell, Review and Appraisal, in BANK SUPERVISION, supra note 302, at 27, 29.
304. Id. at 31.
305. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Eden v. Dep’t of Treasury, 568 F.2d 610, 611 (8th Cir. 1978)
(recognizing the comptroller’s authority to require the First National Bank of Eden to, among other
things, “discontinue its investment in criticized assets” and “correct deficiencies in its internal
control and audit procedures”).
306. Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95630, 92 Stat. 3641 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
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enacted the International Lending Supervision Act,307 section 908 of
which limits judicial review of agency orders regarding bank capital.
And in 1989, Congress passed the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act,308 further narrowing the scope of
judicial review.309
Nor did Congress’s commitment to supervisory governance fade
in the new millennium. In 2001, when it repealed longstanding
structural barriers separating banking from other financial activities,
it added new approval authority tied to agency judgments about the
quality of bank management.310 And in 2010, when Congress passed the
Dodd-Frank Act, it created new methods of “enhanced supervision” for
large financial conglomerates, requiring, among other things, periodic
stress testing. As the Tenth Circuit explained in 2012, while the law
sometimes “leaves banks in the position of enduring any vicissitude
attending the exercise of the regulator’s discretion, Congress is
permitted to prioritize the safety of the banking system over banks’
interest in avoiding subjective or even harsh agency decisions.”311
III. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BANK SUPERVISION
The history of the AMS presents a puzzle. On the one hand, the
AMS, with bank supervision at its core, has a long pedigree and has
307. International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, §§ 902-913, 97 Stat.
1153, 1278 (1983) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3912). Section 908 effectively nullified First Nat’l
Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of Currency, a case where the Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of a bank
challenging an OCC order directing the bank to increase its equity levels. 697 F.2d 674, 685–87
(5th Cir. 1983). See 12 U.S.C. § 3907(b)(1) (“Failure . . . to maintain capital at or above its
minimum level . . . may be deemed by the appropriate Federal banking agency, in its discretion,
to constitute an unsafe and unsound practice within the meaning of section 1818.”).
308. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 10173, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 18 U.S.C.).
309. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 101-54, at 392 (1989) (Conf. Rep.). The status of banks at this
point was very much in dispute, with consensus having shifted toward the licensing model. But
key members of Congress retained an outsourcing view. For example, the chairman of the Senate
Banking Committee, William Proxmire, asked H. Robert Heller, one of the Fed’s governors,
whether he thought banks were “essentially private sector entities which perform certain public
sector services or . . . quasi-public financial utilities on which societal demands can be loaded?”
Heller, a champion of the cresting deregulatory wave, told Proxmire that banks were “not public
utilities.” Yet even Heller noted that banks “perform a number of specialized functions that are
vital to the effective functioning of the nation’s monetary system.” Adopting the “agent theory” and
a moral hazard frame, Heller argued that the “public financial commitment implied by [deposit
insurance and direct access to a lender of last resort] . . . requires a regulatory framework designed
to establish safe and sound operation.” Oversight on the Condition of the Financial Services
Industry: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urb. Affs., 100th Cong. 513 (1988)
(written response of H. Robert Heller, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys.).
310. See Jeremy C. Kress, Solving Banking’s “Too Big To Manage” Problem, 104 MINN. L. REV.
171, 184 (2019).
311. Frontier State Bank Oklahoma City, Okla. v. FDIC, 702 F.3d 588, 597 (10th Cir. 2012).
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endured numerous shocks, only to be strengthened time and again. On
the other hand, as we saw in Part I, the practice of supervision has been
steadily dismantled and reconceptualized over the last thirty years, and
the outsourcing model underlying it has fallen out of the academic (and
political) consciousness, replaced by a licensing model that treats banks
as mere intermediaries. Today, supervision is often seen as vestigial or
worse, a malignancy.312 What explains the erosion of this longstanding
pillar of American public administration?
This Part attributes it to structural decay: the emergence of
shadow banking and the rise of universal banking.313 It argues that
supervisory governance requires more than just broad statutory
powers; it must be sustained by a particular political economy that
supports bank franchise value and limits bank activities. When these
foundations eroded, supervision became vulnerable to intellectual
attack. As often happens, ideological change followed political and
economic transformation.
A. Mixing Banking and Commerce
The AMS began to deteriorate in the 1950s, prompted by the
emergence of financial economics as a discipline and the rise of
“shadow” banks (firms that issue money instruments similar to deposits
but do not have a banking charter). Financial economics abstracted
away from money as a social and political construct—ignoring the need
to create a monetary unit and build a system for buying and selling in
that unit—and modeled banks as financial intermediaries, firms with
assets and liabilities of various durations.314 This approach allowed for
advances in economic theory,315 but collapsed the distinction between
money substitutes and other debt. It also assimilated banking to private
finance, implicitly recharacterizing banking laws as “interventions”

312. See, e.g., CONTI-BROWN, supra note 60, at 169 (“[W]e lack a clear theory of what bank
supervisors are even supposed to do in a world with long lists of federal and state statutory
compliance requirements.”).
313. See supra Section II.B.
314. See, e.g., supra notes 51–54; Mark Flannery, Deposit Insurance Creates a Need for Bank
Regulation, FED. RSRV. BANK PHILA. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 1982, at 17 (“Bankers insured by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) can benefit privately by undertaking risks that the
society as a whole considers excessive. Restrictive bank regulations can thus be viewed as an effort
to undo (or at least to limit) the distortive impact of deposit insurance on bank decisions.”).
315. Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the
Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958); 16 HARRY M. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO
SELECTION: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF INVESTMENTS (1971).
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instead of acts of constitution. These intellectual currents replaced the
outsourcing model with the licensing model.
The licensing model was able to take hold, in part, because of
fundamental changes in the business of banking. First, after 1936,316
the Fed became the exclusive issuer of physical bank notes. Paper
money issued by privately owned banks disappeared. Although these
banks continued to issue its monetary equivalent, account money,
account money only exists on the books of the bank and not in the
physical world. The result is that scholars and policymakers often lump
it together with other debt liabilities, making a theory of banks as mere
financial intermediaries appear more plausible.317
The other major change, and the most important, occurred in the
1950s when the Fed began treating Wall Street securities dealers
similarly to banks and assisting them in expanding the money supply
even though they lacked a banking charter.318 The result was a
decline in the franchise value of banks, a concomitant rise in the
importance of securities dealers, and the erosion of the New Deal
monetary architecture.319
These changes in banking and finance, along with the rise of
money market mutual funds (another issuer of deposit substitutes),
prompted responses that further eroded the AMS. For example, in the
1980s, policymakers began to break down the separation of banking and
commerce. With bank profitability squeezed, and bankers complaining
of increased competition from shadow banks, the OCC and the Fed
sought to level the playing field by removing restrictions on the asset
side of bank balance sheets. The OCC, for example, reinterpreted the

316. KENNETH D. GARBADE, BIRTH OF A MARKET 328–31 (2012).
317. Our jargon has not helped in this regard: although it is common to say that a bank “takes”
a deposit, the stock of deposit liabilities is, in fact, issued. See Ricks, supra note 51, at 760–62
(arguing that the rise of the financial intermediation paradigm can be attributed to the decline of
bank notes and the rise of financial economics).
318. The banks strongly objected. See N.Y. CLEARING HOUSE ASS’N, A STUDY OF THE
INTERRELATIONS OF THE MONEY MARKET AND THE GOVERNMENT SECURITIES MARKET: REPORT TO
THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK 17 (Oct. 22, 1957):
The repurchase agreements entered into by dealers with nonfinancial corporations not
only impair the investment market for short-term U. S. obligations; they represent in
substance a nullification of the intent of the Banking Act of 1933 . . . to forbid banking
activities outside the supervised banking system, and to exclude payment of interest on
demand deposits. They tend to reduce deposits in money market banks and remove
resources which could be available for loans to dealers.
319. See Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System 273–74
(Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Paper No. 2, Fall 2010), https://www.brookings.edu/bpeaarticles/regulating-the-shadow-banking-system-with-comments-and-discussion [https://perma.cc/
JN9T-DDD2].
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NBA to permit national banks to purchase derivatives.320 According to
the OCC, the execution and clearance of customer transactions in
securities, futures, and options, regardless of the nature of the
underlying asset, was an attribute of the “business of banking” and was,
therefore, permissible. As Saule Omarova explains, defining “the
statutory concept of the ‘business of banking’ as a broadly understood
process of financial intermediation . . . rendered [the] concept
meaningless as a potentially limiting device.”321
Once banks began engaging in nonmonetary activities—in
“financial commerce”—policymakers began to scrutinize other aspects
of the system. They challenged laws prohibiting banks from combining
with other types of financial intermediaries.322 Alan Greenspan, who
became chair of the Fed in 1987, pressed Congress to repeal statutory
barriers separating banks and securities dealers.323 And the Fed issued
new rules permitting companies that owned banks to earn up to twentyfive percent of their revenues from previously prohibited broker-dealer
and corporate finance activities.324 In Greenspan’s view, there was no
reason to prevent bank holding companies (“BHCs”) from engaging in
these businesses; if anything, permitting BHCs to enter the securities
business would strengthen them by increasing their profitability.325
Damage to one key pillar of the AMS—separation—led to
intensified scrutiny of another: supervision. As the difference between
banks supervised by the banking agencies and other financial
intermediaries diminished, agency leaders and other policymakers
began to question why banks should continue to be subject to onerous
government oversight.326 Economists at the Fed, in particular,
concluded that traditional supervision was costly and inefficient and
that big, complex financial conglomerates were best disciplined by
320. Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the “Business of
Banking,” 63 U. MIA. L. REV. 1041, 1044–46 (2009).
321. Id. at 1047. See also NationsBank of N.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251,
254 (1995).
322. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Road to the Repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, 17 WAKE
FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 441 (2017).
323. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Remarks at the 27th
Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition: Banking in the 21st Century 2 (May 2,
1991) (transcript available from the Federal Reserve); Testimony Before the H. Subcomm. on Fin.
Insts. Supervision, Regulation & Ins. of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin. & Urb. Affs., 100th Cong.
1 (1987) (testimony of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys.).
324. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Notice, Revenue Limit on Bank-Ineligible
Activities of Subsidiaries of Bank Holding Companies Engaged in Underwriting and Dealing in
Securities, Docket No. R-0841 (Dec. 20, 1996).
325. Testimony Before the H. Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. Supervision, Regulation & Ins. of the H.
Comm. on Banking, Fin. & Urb. Affs., 100th Cong. 1–3 (1987) (testimony of Alan Greenspan,
Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys.).
326. See Menand, supra note 17, at 1564–71.
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market forces. Greenspan and his colleagues also suspected that
substantively overseeing risk-taking by financial conglomerates would
be difficult; accordingly, they developed ways for bank shareholders and
creditors to discipline banks instead.327 To these skeptics, supervision
was an anachronism. The contemporary business of banking was far
more sophisticated than its early-century antecedents. Its complexity
demanded less government oversight and more faith in markets.
The Fed and its sister agencies thus shifted toward intricate
capital rules, which they believed would control bank risk more
efficiently. These capital rules required shareholders to maintain a
certain amount of the skin in the game. The agencies thought that such
equity stakes would incentivize shareholders to monitor bank
executives.328 Meanwhile, the agencies would use their safety and
soundness authority to ensure market participants had access to
accurate information about bank risks. Their new policy, known as
RFS, involved policing processes—governance frameworks, internal
controls, and risk management techniques. RFS was designed to
prevent bank executives from hiding material information from
investors.329 Market incentives, rather than informal oversight, would
ensure that the banking system ran smoothly.
Policymakers also discouraged Congress from regulating
shadow banks. Accordingly, repo and commercial paper markets
expanded rapidly, and the money market mutual fund industry grew to
$3 trillion.330 By 2008, national banks supervised by the OCC and other
financial businesses like broker dealers played similar monetary roles.
Whereas broker dealers once financed themselves with equity and longterm debt, by 2008 they used deposit substitutes, even though they were
not supervised for safety and soundness and had no formal access to
government liquidity programs.331
327. Id.; Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Remarks to the
American Bankers Association: The Evolution of Bank Supervision 3–4 (Oct. 11, 1999) (transcript
available from the Federal Reserve) (“[I]n contemplating the growing complexity of our largest
banking organizations, it seems to us that the supervisors have little choice but to try to rely
more—not less—on market discipline—augmented by more effective public disclosures—to carry
an increasing share of the oversight load.”).
328. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Remarks to the
American Bankers Association: Innovation and Regulation of Banks in the 1990s, at 5 (Oct. 11,
1988) (transcript available from the Federal Reserve) (“The key to engendering market incentives,”
Greenspan explained, “is to require that those owners who would profit from an institution’s
success have the appropriate amount of their own capital at risk”); id. (“There is no better way to
ensure that owners exert discipline on the behavior of their firm than to require that they have a
large stake in that enterprise.”).
329. See Menand, supra note 17, at 1567–74; Meyer, supra note 65, at 99–101.
330. RICKS, supra note 104, at 33–34, 34 fig.1.2.
331. The crisis was a product of this decay. Deposit substitutes were not insured by the
government, and although the businesses and individuals who held them did not consider
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By the early 2000s, two of the four pillars of the AMS had been
severely weakened. The new monetary order retained delegation and
open access: administratively charted, privately owned corporations,
not the government, still created the bulk of the money supply. But the
crucial separation of money creation and commercial dealing eroded.
Desupervision followed close behind.
B. Desupervision
This Section connects on the level of theory the structural
changes in the political economy of finance to the shift away from
supervision. It explains how the emergence of shadow banking and the
rise of universal banking created a mismatch between supervisors’
jurisdiction and their monetary function, undermining one of the
normative underpinnings of supervisory governance. Whereas
banks once embraced,332 or at least did not effectively resist,
discretionary government oversight, today they successfully undermine
informal methods.333
1. The Problem with Shadow Banking
The first part of the structural mismatch is between the scope of
private monetary expansion and the bounds of banking agency
jurisdiction. Shadow banks like securities dealers, foreign firms, and
money market mutual funds now issue huge amounts of deposit
substitutes, used primarily by businesses and institutional investors.
When Congress imported safety and soundness into the U.S. Code in
1933 and expanded supervisory authority in the 1960s, these deposit
substitutes did not exist. By the mid-1990s, they rivaled deposits as a µ
This sort of shadow banking is not new.334 Indeed, the 2008 crisis
was eerily reminiscent of the panic of 1907 and the 1933 collapse. All
themselves to be investors in the issuers, they badly misjudged. See Kathryn Judge, Information
Gaps and Shadow Banking, 103 VA. L. REV. 411 (2017); PISTOR, supra note 104, at 92. When it
became clear that the issuers might fail and that the government did not stand behind these
instruments, panic ensued. See generally GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE
PANIC OF 2007 (2010).
332. See, e.g., Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 674, S. 675,
and S. 918, 77th Cong. 1478 (1941) (Statement of Acting Attorney General Francis Biddle)
(“[B]anking representatives themselves have never complained concerning the absence of formal
hearings, but, on the contrary, prefer the present methods.”).
333. See supra note 21.
334. See Hugh Rockoff, It Is Always the Shadow Banks: The Regulatory Status of the Banks
that Failed and Ignited America’s Greatest Financial Panics, in COPING WITH FINANCIAL CRISES:
SOME LESSONS FROM ECONOMIC HISTORY 77 (Hugh Rockoff & Isao Suto eds., 2018) (discussing
twelve examples of great American financial “panics” and the role shadow banks played in bringing
them about).
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three disasters were the product of runs on money instruments that
policymakers had failed to perceive and regulate as such. In 1907 and
1933, those instruments were deposits issued by state chartered
entities. In 2008, they were deposit substitutes issued by securities
dealers, money market mutual funds, and foreign financial firms.
The contemporary jurisdictional gap undermines supervision.
First, it prevents supervisors from monitoring and disciplining
important issuers. Government agencies cannot effectively manage
monetary outsourcing if only some private money issuers are subject to
their oversight. Second, the gap undermines a key rationale for state
oversight. Why should banks submit to special supervision when their
charters no longer confer the same valuable privileges? Third, and
perhaps most importantly, monetary expansion by firms that are not
regulated like banks undermines the franchise value of banks. One
reason banks in recent decades may routinely resist costly risk
reduction measures imposed by the government is that these measures
are no longer tied to a charter that generates offsetting gains.
2. The Problem with Universal Banking
The second part of the structural mismatch is between the
purpose of state oversight and the activities of today’s banking
conglomerates. As discussed in Part II, when the statutes that comprise
the AMS were enacted in the 1860s, 1930s, and 1960s, bank balance
sheets were strictly limited to high-quality credit assets: government
bonds and various types of senior debt. The regulatory regime—safety
and soundness law—was designed for these assets.
With the emergence of new and riskier forms of financial
investments and activities, and new and more complex financial
conglomerates, the old tools became less potent. Safety and soundness
law, with its broad scope and sharp remedies, was not designed to put
government officials in the middle of market making, asset
management, underwriting, commodities dealing, or private equity
investing (banks were not permitted to engage in these activities at the
time the laws were written). These activities were considered financial
commerce, and banks, given their quasi-governmental status and
power, were to steer clear of commerce. Nor did policymakers expect
supervisors to be able to reach timely and accurate judgments about
bank solvency when volatile and complex assets dominated the lefthand side of bank balance sheets.335

335. See, e.g., Menand, supra note 17.
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This mismatch fuels supervisory disarmament. In the late
1990s, the Fed crafted RFS in part because it believed supervising the
asset-side activities of financial conglomerates would be hard if not
impossible.336 And today, financial conglomerates demand procedural
protections of the sort enjoyed by the nonbanks they compete with in so
much of their business. Mixing banking and commerce, in other words,
obscures the normative assumptions underpinning the outsourcing
model (delegated state power requires close state control).
The result is a less stable equilibrium, both practically and
politically. For example, the tension between informal, discretionary
oversight and modern finance erodes the norms that govern and sustain
the banker-supervisor relationship. When banks were small and
dispersed, they were critical infrastructure in their local communities.
Accordingly, the agencies had to work with them to solve problems—
bankers had a certain degree of leverage. Today, by contrast, many
banks are expendable, as large conglomerates operate nationwide. And
while large conglomerates are not expendable, they are less vulnerable
to discipline. This means that many soft constraints on supervisory
overreach no longer exist. Meanwhile, large conglomerates are more
capable of resisting supervisory direction, leading to further conflict.
For generations, supervision was paired with portfolio-shaping
rules that prohibited banks from engaging in fast moving, difficult-tomonitor financial dealing. Structural laws also limited banks in size
and scope and gave them an effective monopoly on satisfying money
demand. During this period, the banking agencies were built to succeed.
But allowing banks to merge and engage in speculative financial
activities undermined supervisory efficacy. It also disrupted the ability
of nonbanks to compete in these markets. The banking agencies now
face a difficult task: monitoring financial conglomerates engaged in a
range of complex activities. In such an environment, relinquishing
oversight threatens further instability. In fact, the urgency of
supervision is greater in a banking system without separation.
Desupervision under the current regime means private actors are more
likely to exercise public power for private purposes, pocketing gains and
socializing losses.

336. Greenspan and his colleagues thought that the capital rules would prevent excessive risktaking because market participants would do what supervisors could not. But shareholders and
managers, rather than reining in such risk-taking, often promote it, as they stand to gain from
increased returns and banks, due to their monetary functions, can expect support from the state
if their risks do not pay off. See Macey & O’Hara, supra note 53, at 97–99.
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CONCLUSION
This Article began with a question: Why did Congress grant the
banking agencies supervisory power? Part I considered several
answers, none of which drew on the relevant legislative history or
considered the operative statutory text. Part II recovered this history
and analyzed this text. It traced the rise of the American Monetary
Settlement, locating the origins of that settlement alongside bank
supervision in antebellum state law, and it showed how New York,
Massachusetts, and their sister states commissioned special
government officials to outsource money creation to private actors and
still ensure that the money those actors issued was sound. It revealed
that the federal government imported New York’s model during the
Civil War and refined the model during the Great Depression with the
same ends in mind. It categorized supervision as a type of
administrative law in which the government acts as an outsourcer
rather than as a regulator of private activity. And it showed how even
reformers in the mid-twentieth century treated this distinctive form of
governance as necessary and legitimate.
It then identified the root cause of desupervision today—a
mismatch between the rationale for supervisory oversight and the scope
of supervised conduct. In the process, it showed why recent challenges
to the legitimacy of post-crisis supervisory initiatives are misplaced.
“Safety and soundness” is not a “black hole.” Nor are the stress tests an
instance of aberrant government overreach. Bank supervision—and the
scrutiny of banks by expert government officials—is one of the central
planks of a public-private monetary system whose legal structures,
norms, and practices predate the Civil War.
The AMS, however, may be permanently damaged and shadow
and universal banking here to stay. If so, policymakers must confront
the twin deficits of our current system: instability and rent extraction.
Monetary regimes dominated by private control are fragile. And the
government’s efforts to prevent them from melting down during
recessions transfers wealth from the public to special interests.
This suggests, at the very least, maintaining oversight, not
diminishing it. Stress tests are critical tools in this effort—they allow
the government to constrain risk-taking, limiting instability and
reducing rent extraction. In that way, they are a modern variation on
an old theme, designed to counteract the new pressures posed by
conglomeration. To sacrifice their rigor in the name of administrative
law regularity would jeopardize public welfare based on an ahistorical
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and ungrounded reading of the American banking tradition and
American banking law. It is telling that our principal response to the
last financial crisis was to fortify and update a traditional form of
oversight. Abandoning bank supervision now, only a decade removed
from catastrophe, and in the midst of a new economic crisis, would reject
wisdom hard-won over centuries.

